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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC. 2. Doctrine of Constructive Res Judicata. 3. Constitutionality of Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act under Article 14 of the Constitution. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC: The appellant argued that the second application by the plaintiff to amend her plaint by re-inserting the relief under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was barred by the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC. Order 2 Rule 2 CPC mandates that every suit must include the whole of the claim arising from the cause of action, and if a plaintiff omits or relinquishes any part of his claim, he cannot later sue for the omitted or relinquished part. However, the court clarified that this provision applies only when a plaintiff omits to sue a portion of the cause of action on which the suit is based. It does not apply when the plaintiff bases the suit on separate and distinct causes of action and chooses to relinquish one. Therefore, the second amendment application was not barred by the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. 2. Doctrine of Constructive Res Judicata: The appellant contended that the second application for amendment was barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata. The court held that constructive res judicata requires a formal adjudication between the parties after a full hearing. Since the defendant was not in the picture when the plaintiff relinquished her first cause of action, there was no formal adjudication between the parties. Therefore, the doctrine of constructive res judicata did not apply to this case. The second amendment application was made in the same proceedings on a cause of action that the plaintiff was allowed to insert with the court's permission, and neither res judicata nor Order 2 Rule 2 were raised before the Rent Controller. 3. Constitutionality of Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act under Article 14 of the Constitution: The appellant argued that Section 25B, which lays down the procedure for disposing of applications filed by landlords under Sections 14A and 14(1)(e), was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The court emphasized that Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but permits reasonable classification. The classification must have a clear nexus with the objective to be achieved. The court found that the classification made by Section 25B was reasonable and not arbitrary. Section 25B was designed to provide a quick and expeditious relief to landlords requiring premises for bona fide necessity, thus creating a special category for such landlords. This classification was deemed reasonable and in public interest, aimed at preventing delays in obtaining relief. The court also noted that the procedure under Section 25B included safeguards for tenants, such as the requirement for the tenant to file an affidavit disclosing grounds to contest the eviction and the Controller's power to grant leave to contest if the tenant's affidavit disclosed facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order. The absence of an appeal or second appeal was justified by the provision allowing the High Court to review the Controller's order to ensure it was according to law. The court concluded that Section 25B did not violate Article 14 and was constitutionally valid. The appeal was dismissed, with the tenant given time until 31-5-1980 to hand over possession, provided he filed an undertaking to the court and continued to pay compensation equivalent to the rent.
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