2017 (7) TMI 1081 - SC - Indian Laws

Interpretation of statute - Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - the primary argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the definition in Section 2(d) that defines child to mean any person below the age of 18 years, should engulf and embrace, in its connotative expanse, the mental age of a person or the age determined by the prevalent science pertaining to psychiatry so that a mentally retarded person or an extremely intellectually challenged person who even has crossed the biological age of 18 years can be included within the holistic conception of the term child - principle of purposive construction. Held that - While the object of legislation is to provide a remedy for the malady, on the contrary, the legislative intention relates to the meaning from the exposition of the remedy as enacted. The Court further ruled that for determining the purpose of legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which were prevalent at that time when the law was enacted and which necessitated the passing of that enactment and for the limited purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedent factual matrix leading to the legislation, it is open to the court to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which accentuated the statement to provide a remedy for the then existing malady. The purpose of POCSO Act is to treat the minors as a class by itself and treat them separately so that no offence is committed against them as regards sexual assault, sexual harassment and sexual abuse. The sanguine purpose is to safeguard the interest and well being of the children at every stage of judicial proceeding. It provides for a child friendly procedure. It categorically makes a distinction between a child and an adult. On a reading of the POCSO Act, it is clear to us that it is gender neutral. In such a situation, to include the perception of mental competence of a victim or mental retardation as a factor will really tantamount to causing violence to the legislation by incorporating a certain words to the definition. Children with disabilities are dealt with separately and differently from persons with disabilities. Thus, Sections 4, 9 and 31 give certain rights to children with disabilities as opposed to the other provisions, in particular Section 18, which speaks of adult education and participation thereof by persons with disabilities, obviously referring to persons who are physically above 18 years of age. Appeal disposed off.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).
2. Whether the definition of "child" in Section 2(d) should include the "mental age" of a person.
3. Applicability of the POCSO Act to mentally retarded adults.
4. The role of purposive construction in statutory interpretation.
5. The legislative intent behind the POCSO Act.
6. Compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act:
The central issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, which defines "child" as any person below the age of 18 years. The appellant argued that this definition should include the "mental age" of a person, thereby extending the protections of the Act to mentally retarded adults.

2. Whether the definition of "child" should include "mental age":
The appellant, represented by her mother, contended that the definition of "child" should encompass individuals with a mental age below 18 years, even if their biological age exceeds 18 years. This argument was supported by references to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and various provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) that consider mental capacity.

3. Applicability of the POCSO Act to mentally retarded adults:
The appellant's counsel argued that the POCSO Act should apply to mentally retarded adults, emphasizing the need for a trial in a child-friendly environment. The High Court had directed the trial to be conducted by a lady judge but did not transfer the case to a Special Court under the POCSO Act.

4. The role of purposive construction in statutory interpretation:
The judgment extensively discussed the principle of purposive construction, which involves interpreting statutes in a manner that furthers their intended purpose. The appellant's counsel urged the Court to adopt a purposive approach, arguing that including mental age within the definition of "child" would align with the POCSO Act's objective of protecting vulnerable individuals from sexual abuse.

5. The legislative intent behind the POCSO Act:
The Court examined the Preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the POCSO Act, which emphasize the protection of children from sexual offenses and the establishment of child-friendly procedures. The Court noted that the legislature specifically defined "child" based on biological age and did not include mental age, suggesting a deliberate legislative choice.

6. Compensation under Section 357A of the CrPC:
Given that the accused had died during the proceedings, the Court addressed the issue of compensation under Section 357A of the CrPC. The Court directed the State Legal Services Authority to award compensation to the victim, considering her mental disability and the specific circumstances of the case.

Conclusion:
The Court concluded that the definition of "child" in Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act does not include mental age. The legislative intent, as reflected in the Act's language and purpose, focuses on biological age. The Court emphasized that any extension of the definition to include mental age would require legislative action, not judicial interpretation. Consequently, the appellant's request to transfer the case to a Special Court under the POCSO Act was not granted. However, the Court directed the State Legal Services Authority to award maximum compensation to the victim under the relevant scheme.

Judgment by R.F. Nariman:
Justice R.F. Nariman concurred with the primary judgment, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the constitutional separation of powers. He reiterated that judicial interpretation should not extend to legislative law-making and supported the conclusion that the definition of "child" in the POCSO Act does not include mental age.