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Issues Involved:
1. Right of Pre-emption 2. Superior Right of Pre-emption 3. Doctrine of Lis Pendens 4. Procedural Aspects under the Punjab Pre-emption Act Detailed Analysis: 1. Right of Pre-emption The appeal raises a question pertaining to the Law of Pre-emption. It involves a dispute over land sold on August 26, 1949, and the subsequent pre-emption suit filed by defendants 8 to 11 on August 26, 1950. The right of pre-emption is defined as "a preferential right to acquire land, belonging to another person upon the occasion of a transfer by the latter." This right is not a right to the land itself but a right to the offer of the land about to be sold. The preemptor has two rights: an inherent or primary right to the offer and a secondary or remedial right to follow the thing sold. 2. Superior Right of Pre-emption The plaintiffs in Suit No. 13 of 1951 claimed a superior right of pre-emption. However, the Subordinate Judge found that defendants 8 to 11, by obtaining a decree for pre-emption before the rival claimants filed their suit, had become vendees through Court. The District Judge later held that the plaintiffs and defendants 8 to 11 had equal rights of pre-emption and were entitled to share the sale in proportion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right of pre-emption is a right of substitution, not of re-purchase, and the preemptor must have a superior right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his place. 3. Doctrine of Lis Pendens The doctrine of lis pendens, which states that neither party to litigation can alienate the property to affect the opponent, applies to pre-emption suits. However, this doctrine does not affect a pre-existing right. The Supreme Court noted that the appellants' right of pre-emption was subsisting at the time they deposited the amount and took possession of the land. Therefore, they were not hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and acquired an indefeasible right to the suit land. 4. Procedural Aspects under the Punjab Pre-emption Act The Punjab Pre-emption Act provides a procedure for enforcing the right of pre-emption but does not enlarge the content of that right. Section 4 defines the right, Section 13 allows joint or several exercise of the right, and Section 17 regulates the distribution of pre-empted land among equally entitled preemptors. Section 28 allows the Court to join multiple suits arising from the same sale to avoid conflict of decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not enable a preemptor to exercise the right without establishing a superior right over the vendee or the person substituted in his place. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appellants, having complied with the conditions laid down in the compromise decree, were substituted in place of the vendee before the present suit was disposed of. Consequently, the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed with costs throughout. The judgment underscores the importance of establishing a superior right of pre-emption and the limited scope of the doctrine of lis pendens in pre-emption suits.
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