1989 (1) TMI 11 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Impleading of a third party in a criminal proceeding.
2. Locus standi of the petitioner.
3. Public interest in prosecution.
4. Constitutional validity of sections 269SS and 276DD of the Income-tax Act.
5. Allegations of mala fide delay in the disposal of the main petition.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Impleading of a Third Party in a Criminal Proceeding:
The petitioner sought to be impleaded as a party respondent in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2854 of 1988. The court examined whether there is any provision in the Criminal Procedure Code that allows for the impleading of a third party in a prosecution case. It was noted that section 301 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows a private person to instruct a pleader to act under the directions of the public prosecutor but does not provide for the impleading of a third party. The court concluded that there is no provision to get a third party impleaded in a criminal proceeding, though a third party can assist the public prosecutor to a limited extent.

2. Locus Standi of the Petitioner:
The petitioner claimed to have locus standi based on the pronouncements in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and S. P. Gupta v. President of India. However, the court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak, which stated that the locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence, except where the statute provides for it. Section 279 of the Income-tax Act specifies that prosecution for certain offences can only be initiated at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax. Consequently, the petitioner was deemed incompetent to initiate or intervene in the prosecution.

3. Public Interest in Prosecution:
The petitioner argued that public interest was involved in prosecuting the first respondent for alleged violations of the Income-tax Act. However, the court held that the prosecution was a private complaint filed by the Income-tax Department, which is compoundable at any stage by the Commissioner of Income-tax. The court found no public wrong or public injury involved in this prosecution, and therefore, the petitioner had no locus standi to intervene.

4. Constitutional Validity of Sections 269SS and 276DD of the Income-tax Act:
The first respondent had challenged the constitutional validity of sections 269SS and 276DD of the Income-tax Act as being ultra vires and offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The court noted that this question of law was res integra and raised for the first time in the petition. However, the court did not delve into the merits of this challenge as it was beyond the scope of the current petition for impleading.

5. Allegations of Mala Fide Delay in the Disposal of the Main Petition:
The petitioner alleged that the second respondent had deliberately delayed moving the court to vacate the stay, thereby failing to discharge his obligation. The court observed that the main petition for quashing the proceedings was admitted and notice was issued for service. There was no specific material regarding any mala fide delay brought to the court's notice. The court found no evidence of mala fide delay on the part of the second respondent.

Conclusion:
The petition for impleading the petitioner as a party respondent was dismissed as it was not maintainable under the Criminal Procedure Code. Consequently, the petition for vacating the stay already granted by the court was also dismissed. The court emphasized that the petitioner had no locus standi and there was no public interest involved in the prosecution initiated by the Income-tax Department. The allegations regarding the first respondent's nomination for the Assembly election were deemed beyond the scope of this petition and subject to election petition procedures.