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Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the sale proceeds of house property credited in the firm's books. 2. Exclusion of sums from the principal value of the estate under sections 46(1) and 46(2) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Nature of the Sale Proceeds of House Property Credited in the Firm's Books: The first question addressed by the court was whether the sale proceeds of the house property credited in the firm's books were in the nature of a trust and thus did not form part of the firm's assets. The court examined the facts and circumstances of the case, and the Appellate Tribunal's justification for holding that the sale proceeds were in the nature of a trust. The court's analysis focused on the legal principles governing the characterization of trust property and the implications for the firm's assets. The judgment did not explicitly resolve this issue but indicated that it would be addressed in the context of the overall decision. 2. Exclusion of Sums from the Principal Value of the Estate under Sections 46(1) and 46(2) of the Estate Duty Act: The second question involved the interpretation of section 46(1)(b) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, and whether the sums of Rs. 2,923 and Rs. 47,077 should be excluded from the principal value of the estate. The court noted that there were conflicting decisions on the interpretation of this provision, specifically between the cases of Ratnakumari Kumbhat v. CED [1975] 101 ITR 572 and CED v. Smt. S. T. B. Ameen Khaleeli [1983] 143 ITR 679. In Ratnakumari Kumbhat's case, the court observed that section 46(1)(b) consists of two parts: one dealing with consideration given by any person entitled to property derived from the deceased, and the other dealing with consideration given by any person whose resources included property derived from the deceased. The court emphasized that the timing of when the creditor derived property from the deceased (before or after the loan transaction) was immaterial, provided there was a nexus between the loan transaction and the property derived. Conversely, in Ameen Khaleeli's case, the court held that the derivation of property by the creditor must occur prior to the advancement of the loan to the deceased to establish a nexus, thus giving a restricted interpretation to the phrase "at any time" in section 46(1)(b). The Full Bench resolved this conflict by approving the interpretation in Ratnakumari Kumbhat's case, which allowed for a broader understanding of the timing of property derivation. The court stated that the ultimate criterion for abatement of a debt is the proportionate value of the consideration given for the debt, which could occur either before or after the loan. The court rejected the restricted interpretation in Ameen Khaleeli's case, emphasizing that the statutory language should be interpreted strictly without implying additional requirements not expressly stated. Conclusion: The court approved the broader interpretation of section 46(1)(b) from Ratnakumari Kumbhat's case and overruled any contrary observations in Ameen Khaleeli's case. The matter was remanded to the Division Bench for further consideration on merits, with no order as to costs.
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