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Interpretation of penalty provisions under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 prior to and after an amendment in 1976. Detailed Analysis: The judgment pertains to reference applications under section 27(3) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, involving the imposition of penalties for default under section 18(1)(a) before and after an amendment made with effect from April 1, 1976. The key question raised was whether penalties should be computed in accordance with the provisions of the amended law even for defaults occurring prior to the amendment. The assessee, an individual, failed to file wealth-tax returns as required by section 14(1) of the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1973-74 to 1975-76. The Wealth-tax Officer initiated penalty proceedings and imposed penalties for the defaults. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal based their decisions on the interpretation of section 18(1)(a)(i) as amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that penalties should be levied at 2 per cent of the assessed tax for defaults continuing after April 1, 1976, based on a Supreme Court judgment. The Tribunal upheld this decision, stating that it cannot interfere as it aligns with the Supreme Court's interpretation of penalty provisions. The petitioner argued that a previous Division Bench decision should apply, emphasizing that the law applicable for penalty should be that in force at the time of the default, not the later amendment. However, the court, after considering the arguments and case law cited, concluded that the Supreme Court decision in Maya Rani Punj's case had implicitly overruled the previous decision relied upon by the petitioner. The court affirmed that the Tribunal's reliance on the Supreme Court decision was appropriate and declined to order a reference, dismissing the applications. The judgment highlights the significance of judicial interpretations in determining the application of penalty provisions under the Wealth-tax Act, emphasizing the precedence of higher court decisions in guiding legal outcomes.
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