1922 (1) TMI 2 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of a recital in a judgment not inter-partes as evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act.
2. Applicability of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act to judgments.
3. Interpretation of Section 35 of the Evidence Act in relation to judgments.
4. Relevance of case law and precedents in determining the admissibility of judgments as evidence.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Admissibility of a Recital in a Judgment Not Inter-Partes as Evidence Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act:
The primary issue was whether a statement in a judgment not involving the same parties (not inter-partes) is admissible as evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The plaintiff sought to recover immovable properties, claiming they were purchased from the reversionary heirs of Adinarayana. The date of death of Chandramma, Adinarayana's mother, was crucial to determine if the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff relied on a statement in a previous judgment (Ex. B) asserting Chandramma died on May 3, 1904. The Subordinate Judge considered this statement relevant and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. However, the District Judge dismissed the suit, finding the statement in a non-inter-partes judgment inadmissible. The High Court ultimately held that Section 35 does not apply to judgments, and such statements are not admissible unless the judgment falls within Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.

2. Applicability of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act to Judgments:
Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act govern the relevancy of judgments. Section 40 addresses judgments that prevent courts from taking cognizance of a suit. Section 41 deals with final judgments in specific jurisdictions and considers them conclusive proof. Section 42 pertains to judgments on public matters, which are evidence but not conclusive proof. Section 43 states that judgments not covered by Sections 40, 41, and 42 are irrelevant unless their existence is a fact in issue or relevant under another provision. Section 44 allows parties to challenge judgments obtained by fraud or delivered by an incompetent court. The High Court emphasized that these sections codify the law on the admissibility of judgments, and a judgment not inter-partes does not become relevant merely because it contains a statement on a fact in issue.

3. Interpretation of Section 35 of the Evidence Act in Relation to Judgments:
Section 35 of the Evidence Act pertains to entries made by public servants in official records, which are relevant facts. The High Court found that applying Section 35 to judgments would be a misinterpretation, as it deals with entries made by public officials in the exercise of statutory duties. The court held that a judge writing a judgment is not making an entry in a public or official record as contemplated by Section 35. Accepting the plaintiff's argument would render every judgment admissible to prove relevant facts, contradicting the specific provisions of Sections 40 to 44.

4. Relevance of Case Law and Precedents in Determining the Admissibility of Judgments as Evidence:
The court reviewed several precedents, including Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh, Bythamma v. Avidia, Thama v. Kondan, and Krishnaswami Ayyangar v. Rajagopala Ayyangar, which supported the plaintiff's argument. However, the High Court disagreed with these decisions, finding them inconsistent with the correct interpretation of the Evidence Act. The court preferred the reasoning in Kashinath Pal v. Jagat Kishori and the Privy Council's judgment in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das, which held that recitals in judgments not inter-partes are not admissible as evidence. The court concluded that Section 35 does not apply to judgments and that judgments not inter-partes are not admissible under Sections 40 to 44 unless they meet specific criteria.

Conclusion:
The High Court answered the question in the negative, holding that a recital in a judgment not inter-partes is not admissible as evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The court emphasized the specific provisions of Sections 40 to 44 governing the admissibility of judgments and rejected the broader interpretation of Section 35 that would render all judgments admissible, irrespective of the parties involved.