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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the respondent's actions constituted an "attempt" under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. 2. Whether Clause 3 of the U.P. Wheat (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1940, is invalid under Articles 19(1)(g), 301, 302, and 303 of the Constitution. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the respondent's actions constituted an "attempt" under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act: The prosecution's case was that the respondent attempted to transport a mixture of grain containing more than 18 percent wheat, contravening the Order. The trial court found the respondent guilty, sentencing him to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a Rs. 100 fine, with the 72 bags of grain forfeited to the State. However, the Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent, holding that intercepting the boat midstream meant the matter did not go beyond preparation for transporting the grain, thus no offence under Section 7 was committed. The State contended that the respondent's act amounted to an "attempt" to transport the grain, thereby committing an offence under Section 7. The court discussed the stages of crime: intention, preparation, attempt, and commission. It noted the difficulty in distinguishing between preparation and attempt, citing various precedents. The court referenced Section 511, I.P.C., and several cases to illustrate the distinction between preparation and attempt. It concluded that an intentional act towards the commission of an offence, failing due to circumstances independent of the volition of the person, constitutes an "attempt." Applying this principle, the court determined that the respondent's act amounted to an attempt to transport the grain in contravention of Clause 3 of the Order, interrupted by the Assistant Marketing Inspector. 2. Whether Clause 3 of the U.P. Wheat (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1940, is invalid under Articles 19(1)(g), 301, 302, and 303 of the Constitution: The respondent argued that Clause 3 of the Order, which restricts the movement of wheat without a permit, violated Articles 19(1)(g), 301, 302, and 303 of the Constitution. The court examined whether the clause imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right to trade and commerce. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Dwarka Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where unrestricted power given to the State Controller was deemed unreasonable. However, it distinguished this case from Harishanker Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where the requirement of a permit for transporting cotton textiles was upheld as a reasonable restriction in public interest. The court held that the policy underlying the Order was to regulate the movement of wheat to ensure even distribution and availability at fair prices, thus the discretion given to the State Government or authorized officers was not arbitrary. It noted that the Essential Commodities Act provided the policy and norms for granting permits. Regarding Articles 301, 302, and 303, the court found that the Order regulated intra-state movement of wheat, falling under Entry 26 of List 2 of Schedule VII of the Constitution, and did not impinge upon inter-state trade and commerce. The court distinguished this case from Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, concluding that the Order did not directly or immediately restrict trade between states. Conclusion: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal, and convicted the respondent under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act read with Clause 3 of the Order. The respondent was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 250, and in default, six months' rigorous imprisonment. The 72 bags of grain, or their sale proceeds, were forfeited to the State.
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