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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the plaintiff's suit to recover possession of certain lands is barred by limitation. 2. Whether the lands in question were vested in the defendants in trust for a specific purpose under Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 3. Whether the defendants had been in adverse possession of the lands for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Limitation Bar The primary question for determination was whether the plaintiff's suit to recover possession of certain lands from the defendants was barred by limitation. Both the First Subordinate Judge of Saharanpur and the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad held that the suit was not barred by limitation, based on the provisions of Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit, and the defendants' appeal to the High Court was dismissed with costs. Issue 2: Trust for Specific Purpose The plaintiff's case was that the entire village was dedicated as waqf for the expenses of the shrine and for the maintenance of the Sajjadanashin. The defendants were mujawars who were allowed to occupy the lands in suit for their maintenance in return for their services. Both Courts in India held that the entire village was included in the waqf and that the plaintiff was the Sajjadanashin. The Courts concluded that the mujawar defendants could not set up adverse possession, even though they had been dismissed from their appointment as mujawars in 1898 and had remained in possession of the lands until the date of the suit in 1926. However, the question arose whether the unamended Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was applicable. The section stated that no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose shall be barred by any length of time. The suit was brought on January 29, 1926, and the Amendment Act of 1929, which deemed property in religious endowments as vested in trust for a specific purpose, was not applicable. The unamended Section 10 required the plaintiff to show that the lands had become vested in the defendants in trust for a specific purpose. The judgment referenced Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, which clarified that under Mahommedan Law, once a property is declared as waqf, the ownership is transferred to God Almighty, and the manager (mutawalli or Sajjadanashin) is merely a manager, not a trustee in the technical sense. The amendment of Section 10 in 1929 was a response to this decision. The judgment concluded that the suit did not come within the provisions of Section 10 as it stood unamended at the time of the institution of the suit, and thus, the decision of the Courts in India could not be supported on this ground. Issue 3: Adverse Possession The defendants argued that they had been in adverse possession of the lands for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit, relying on Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The fourth issue settled in the trial Court was whether the defendants had been in possession for more than twelve years and whether their possession had become adverse and proprietary. The defendants had not succeeded in obtaining a decision in their favor on this issue by either of the Courts in India. The High Court did not decide this issue, basing their conclusion on Section 10 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Subordinate Judge also held that Section 10 was applicable, and thus, no question of limitation arose. The judgment considered whether the case should be remitted to the Courts in India for a specific finding on this issue but decided to dispose of it based on the existing evidence. The defendants' plea of adverse possession was inconsistent with the application of Article 139, which relates to a landlord suing to recover possession from a tenant. The judgment noted that the mujawars had asserted their title to the lands adversely in 1894 but did not persist in their contention after the suit was decided against them. They were content to occupy the position of attendants and servants of the shrines. The continued occupation of the lands by the mujawars was deemed to be by the leave and license of the Sajjadanashin, induced through their services at two of the shrines. The judgment concluded that the defendants had not discharged the onus of proving adverse possession. Transfers made by some mujawars within twelve years of the suit did not raise a question of limitation, and older transfers between mujawars inter se did not show adverse possession against the Sajjadanashin. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the judgment of the Courts in India was upheld.
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