1984 (4) TMI 43 - HC - Income Tax

Issues Involved:
1. Levy of interest under Section 139(8)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
2. Validity of Explanation 2 to Section 139(8)(a) under Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Nature of interest under Section 139(8)(a) - whether compensatory or penal.
4. Comparison with penalty provisions under Section 271 of the Income Tax Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Levy of Interest under Section 139(8)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961:
The assessees, registered firms, challenged the levy of interest under Section 139(8)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, contending that Explanation 2 to this section is ultra vires and void. The interest was charged for various assessment years through specific orders which were impugned by the petitioners. Section 139 obligates every person liable to be assessed to furnish a return of income by a specified date. Failure to do so results in the automatic accrual of interest at 12% per annum, calculated from the day following the specified date to the date of furnishing the return or completion of the assessment.

2. Validity of Explanation 2 to Section 139(8)(a) under Article 14 of the Constitution:
The petitioners argued that Explanation 2 to Section 139(8)(a) is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the Constitution. This Explanation mandates that for computing interest, a registered firm is treated as if it were an unregistered firm, resulting in a higher interest liability. The court examined whether this provision results in unreasonable classification and found that the classification is based on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Jain Brothers v. Union of India, which upheld similar provisions under Section 271(2), stating that the legislature can withhold benefits in case of default.

3. Nature of Interest under Section 139(8)(a) - Compensatory or Penal:
The court addressed the nature of interest under Section 139(8)(a), considering arguments that interest is compensatory and not penal. The petitioners relied on the Karnataka High Court's decision in M. Nagappa v. ITO, which held that interest is compensatory, intended to reimburse the Revenue for loss due to delayed tax payment. The court acknowledged the divergence in judicial opinion but concluded that interest, although compensatory, also serves as a deterrent against default. The interest payable by registered firms, calculated as if they were unregistered, does not amount to a penalty but is a statutory consequence of default.

4. Comparison with Penalty Provisions under Section 271 of the Income Tax Act:
The court compared the interest provisions under Section 139(8)(a) with penalty provisions under Section 271. It noted that while penalties under Section 271 require the satisfaction of the competent officer regarding the assessee's default, interest under Section 139(8)(a) accrues automatically upon default. The court emphasized that both interest and penalty are additional liabilities under the Act, with interest being compensatory and penalty being punitive. The court held that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Jain Brothers regarding penalties applies equally to interest, thereby upholding the validity of Explanation 2 to Section 139(8)(a).

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the original petitions, holding that Explanation 2 to Section 139(8)(a) is neither arbitrary, unfair, nor discriminatory, and does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The orders charging interest were deemed valid, and the petitions were dismissed without any order as to costs.

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