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Issues Involved:
1. Conviction under the Defence of India Rules. 2. Jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 130(1) of the Defence of India Rules. 3. Proof and notice of orders under Rule 119(1) of the Defence of India Rules. 4. Admissibility and relevance of evidence. 5. Mens rea and vicarious liability. 6. Use of recorded statements and uncorroborated evidence of accomplices. Detailed Analysis: 1. Conviction under the Defence of India Rules: The appellants were convicted on November 4, 1943, by the Deputy Magistrate of Darbhanga under the Defence of India Rules relating to the control of prices and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The Sessions Judge confirmed the convictions and the sentences. Applications to the High Court of Patna for the revision of the judgment of the Sessions Judge were dismissed. The appellants obtained special leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court to His Majesty in Council. 2. Jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 130(1) of the Defence of India Rules: Rule 130(1) of the Defence of India Rules provides that "no Court or tribunal shall take cognizance of any alleged contravention of these Rules, except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such contravention, made by a public servant." It was not in dispute that Mr. A. Karim, the Price Control Officer, was a "public servant," and it was proved that on August 16, 1943, he made a report in writing to the District Magistrate. Their Lordships opined that the main object of Rule 130(1) was to protect persons against charges made by private individuals who might be irresponsible or malicious. The Court was entitled to "take cognizance" of all the offences charged against the appellants based on the report. 3. Proof and notice of orders under Rule 119(1) of the Defence of India Rules: The appellants contended that no satisfactory evidence had been adduced to prove that any orders had been made, and alternatively, that it had not been proved that proper notice of the order or orders alleged had been given to comply with Rule 119(1). The High Court agreed with the appellants' contention that no orders had been proved but held that the making of an order could be presumed. Their Lordships opined that the District Magistrate intended to make, and in fact made, "orders" when he signed the documents submitted to him for "orders" by the Price Control Officer. The presumption that the District Magistrate did what he is likely to have done, "regard being had to the common course of...public business," was supported by the evidence of a practice by which price lists were circulated among interested persons. 4. Admissibility and relevance of evidence: A number of dealers were called who spoke of transactions, not the subject of any charge, which they had had with the appellants. This evidence proved beyond doubt that the 1st appellant knew of the 2nd appellant's illegal exactions and connived at them. The evidence was admissible and relevant to both charges, as it showed an intention to aid the commission of the offence and an intentional omission to put a stop to an illegal practice. 5. Mens rea and vicarious liability: The High Court took the view that even if the 1st appellant had not been proved to have known of the unlawful acts of the 2nd appellant, he would still be liable on the ground that "where there is an absolute prohibition and no question of mens rea arises, the master is criminally liable for the acts of his servant." Their Lordships expressed their dissent from this view, stating that offences against the Defence of India Rules in question are not within the class of offences that can be held to be committed without a guilty mind. They emphasized the importance of mens rea as a constituent part of a crime. 6. Use of recorded statements and uncorroborated evidence of accomplices: Some complaint was made that the Deputy Magistrate had paid attention to recorded statements of persons who were not called to give evidence before him. Their Lordships stated that even if those statements are wholly left out of account, there was still ample evidence to justify the Deputy Magistrate's decision. Regarding the reliance on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices, Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that "an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person" and that "a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." The evidence of accomplices ought to be regarded with suspicion, but the degree of suspicion varies according to the extent and nature of the complicity. Conclusion: Their Lordships found no sufficient reason for reversing the decision of the Courts in India and advised His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed.
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