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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. 2. Whether the omission to securely fence the fermentation vats constituted a continuing offence. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the complaint filed by the Chief Inspector of Factories was barred by limitation under Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. The respondents contended that the complaint was time-barred since the offence first came to the knowledge of the Inspector on 27-10-1957, and the complaint was filed more than three months after this date. The trial court, relying on an unreported decision in Shaligram Mehta v. State of M.P., held that the complaint was indeed barred by time and dismissed it accordingly. The relevant portion of Section 106 of the Act states: "No Court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months, of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector." 2. Whether the omission to securely fence the fermentation vats constituted a continuing offence. The State contended that the omission to securely fence the fermentation vats was a continuing offence, meaning that every day's non-compliance constituted a new offence. The court upheld this contention, stating that Section 33 of the Act requires that fermentation vats be securely fenced, and non-compliance with this provision constitutes a contravention punishable under Section 92 of the Act. The court cited several precedents to support its view that the omission was a continuing offence. In Verney v. Mark Fletcher and Sons Ltd., it was held that an offence was committed on each day the factory was not kept in conformity with the Act. Similarly, in The Public Prosecutor v. Veerabhadrappa, it was held that the offence was a continuing one, and a fresh offence was committed each day the omission continued. The court explained that an offence might be committed by either a positive act prohibited by law or by the omission to perform a duty required by law. In the case of an omission, every day the omission continues constitutes a fresh offence. This interpretation aligns with the practice of not considering fractions of a day for computing limitation and the provision in Section 92 of the Act for continuing penalties. The court further clarified the concept of a "continuing offence," explaining that it refers to an ongoing state of affairs where the omission of a duty continues day after day, giving rise to a fresh offence each day. This concept is distinct from recurring offences, which involve repeated positive acts. The court rejected the respondents' contention that the policy of the Act required a speedy complaint within three months of the first contravention. It held that such an interpretation would render Section 106 of the Act nugatory and allow defaulters to evade their obligations under the Act by stalling for time until the limitation period expired. The court also examined the purpose of Section 106, concluding that it prescribes a trial jurisdiction for the Magistrate, limiting the court's jurisdiction to offences committed within three months of the complaint. It rejected the analogy to Section 23 of the Limitation Act, stating that the principle underlying that section is of universal application and does not require specific invocation by the Act. The court overruled the decision in Shaligram Mehta's case, which held that there could be no conviction for a continuing contravention without a previous conviction for the original contravention. It also disagreed with the decision in G.D. Bhattar v. The State, which held that the prosecution could not select any particular date following the contravention for launching a prosecution. Conclusion: The court allowed the revision application, setting aside the trial court's order dismissing the complaint as barred by time. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the law.
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