1974 (4) TMI 117 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Domicile of the deceased (Krishnan) at the time of death.
2. Applicability of English law versus the Travancore Ezhava Act in succession matters.
3. Validity of Ex. 56 order and its operation as res judicata.
4. Allegations of fraud in obtaining Ex. 56 order.
5. Procedural fairness and principles of natural justice in the foreign proceedings.
6. Jurisdiction of the English court over minors.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Domicile of the deceased (Krishnan) at the time of death:
The core issue was whether Krishnan was domiciled in England or Travancore at the time of his death. The trial court and High Court initially found that Krishnan was not domiciled in England, but the Supreme Court concluded otherwise. The Supreme Court examined Krishnan's intentions through his letters and actions, noting a shift in his intentions post-1939. Despite earlier intentions to return to India, Krishnan's later actions and statements, particularly those to Miss Hepworth, indicated a settled intention to remain in England. The Court emphasized the importance of conduct over mere declarations, ultimately determining that Krishnan had acquired a domicile of choice in England.

2. Applicability of English law versus the Travancore Ezhava Act in succession matters:
The determination of Krishnan's domicile was crucial for deciding the applicable law for succession. The High Court had ruled that the succession to Krishnan's movables should be governed by the Travancore Ezhava Act, while the Supreme Court held that English law would govern the succession to both the movables and moneys left by Krishnan, as he was domiciled in England. The sale proceeds of the house in Sheffield were to be distributed according to English law, which the parties did not dispute.

3. Validity of Ex. 56 order and its operation as res judicata:
The trial court and High Court found that Ex. 56 order, which declared Krishnan domiciled in England, was obtained by fraud and did not operate as res judicata. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the evidence did not support the allegation of fraud. The Court noted that the administrators, Arksey and Mary Woodliff, had no motive to commit fraud and were competent to testify about Krishnan's domicile. The Supreme Court concluded that Ex. 56 order was valid and operated as res judicata for the major respondents who had submitted to the jurisdiction of the English court.

4. Allegations of fraud in obtaining Ex. 56 order:
The High Court had found that Ex. 56 order was obtained by fraud, but the Supreme Court rejected this finding. The Supreme Court emphasized that fraud must be proven by new and material facts not before the original court. The evidence presented, including letters and affidavits, did not demonstrate that the administrators or the first defendant had misled the English court. The Court highlighted that the administrators acted in good faith and that there was no indication of knowingly false evidence being presented.

5. Procedural fairness and principles of natural justice in the foreign proceedings:
The High Court had ruled that the proceedings in which Ex. 56 order was obtained were opposed to natural justice, particularly concerning the minors. The Supreme Court, however, found that the natural guardians of the minors were given notice, and the court had appointed a guardian ad litem for the minors. The Court held that this satisfied the requirements of natural justice, as the minors had an opportunity to contest the proceedings through their natural guardians.

6. Jurisdiction of the English court over minors:
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the English court had jurisdiction over the minors, given that their guardians did not submit to the jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the English court did not have jurisdiction over the minors, as they did not submit to the court's jurisdiction. However, this did not affect the validity of Ex. 56 order concerning the major respondents who had submitted to the jurisdiction.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that the sale proceeds of the house in Sheffield should be distributed according to English law. However, it set aside the High Court's decision regarding the movables and moneys, ruling that these should also be governed by English law. The appeal was allowed, and the amount specified in Schedule-C, minus the sale proceeds of the house, was to be distributed between the first and second defendants in equal shares. No order was made as to costs.