1993 (7) TMI 364 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Whether the tuition fee collected by unaided English Medium Educational Institutions can exceed the ceiling prescribed by G.O. Ms. 379 dated 9-8-1985.
2. Whether G.O. Ms. 379 stands superseded by the Rules framed through G.O. Ms. 524 dated 20-12-1988.
3. The effect of the representation made by the Advocate General in the earlier batch of writ petitions.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Tuition Fee Ceiling:

The primary issue is whether unaided English Medium Educational Institutions can collect tuition fees exceeding the ceiling prescribed by G.O. Ms. 379 dated 9-8-1985. The court noted that G.O. Ms. 379 was issued under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 (Act 5/83), which empowered the government to regulate tuition fees. The petitioners challenged the validity and enforceability of G.O. Ms. 379, arguing that it was superseded by the rules framed under the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 through G.O. Ms. 524 dated 20-12-1988. The court examined the provisions of both enactments and the criteria for fixing tuition fees as laid out in Rule 18 of G.O. Ms. 524, which allowed institutions to determine their fee structure within the maximum limits prescribed by the government.

2. Supersession of G.O. Ms. 379 by G.O. Ms. 524:

The court analyzed whether G.O. Ms. 379 was superseded by G.O. Ms. 524. The petitioners argued that G.O. Ms. 379 was impliedly repealed by the comprehensive rules framed under G.O. Ms. 524, which provided a detailed scheme for fee fixation. The respondents contended that G.O. Ms. 379 subsisted and that there was no inconsistency between the two G.Os. The court found that the criteria for fixing tuition fees under G.O. Ms. 379 were not discernible and that Rule 18 of G.O. Ms. 524 laid down a comprehensive scheme for fee fixation. The court concluded that the intention of the rule-making authority was to replace the existing fee scales by new scales of fee arrived at based on the criteria laid down by the rules. The court rejected the contention that the fee scales prescribed in G.O. Ms. 379 should still be regarded as the maximum fee contemplated by Rule 18(1).

3. Representation by the Advocate General:

The court considered the effect of the representation made by the Advocate General in the earlier batch of writ petitions, where it was stated that G.O. Ms. 379 was no longer in force and had been superseded by G.O. Ms. 524. The court noted that the representation was made based on instructions from the concerned authorities and that the Division Bench had accepted this representation, leading to the disposal of the writ petitions as infructuous. The court held that the government and its agencies were precluded from taking a contrary stand in the present litigation and ignoring the effect of the earlier judgment. The court emphasized that the government should have undertaken the exercise of fixing the maximum fee in accordance with Rule 18, rather than relying on the outdated fee scales prescribed in G.O. Ms. 379.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that G.O. Ms. 379 dated 9-8-1985 could not be enforced against the Managements of unaided English Medium Schools. The scales of fees arrived at by the petitioner-Managements in compliance with Rule 18(2) of the Rules in G.O. Ms. 524 were subject to the maximum that may be prescribed by the government under Rule 18(1). The court allowed the writ petition and dissolved the injunction granted by the appellate court in the C.R.P., directing the petitioners to abide by the maximum fee that may be prescribed by the government under Rule 18(1) until the disposal of the suit.