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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 2. Applicability of rent in kind under Section 50. 3. Reference to legislative history and reports for statutory interpretation. Detailed Analysis: Interpretation of Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act: The primary issue in these appeals was the interpretation of Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The plaintiffs, who were tenants, argued that they were raiyats at fixed rents, having held their tenancies at a uniform rent for over 20 years. The rent receipts produced showed that the rent was partly in cash and partly in kind (paddy). The Revenue Officer and the Special Judge both held that Section 50 was not applicable because the term 'rent' in that section did not include rent in kind. However, the High Court found that Section 50 must be read along with Section 3(5) of the Act, which defines 'rent' as whatever is lawfully payable or deliverable in money or kind by a tenant to his landlord. Therefore, the term 'rent' in Section 50 includes rent in kind, and the substantive rule and presumption under Section 50 apply to tenancies with rent payable partly in cash and partly in kind or entirely in kind. Applicability of Rent in Kind under Section 50: The High Court noted that there was a significant judicial opinion favoring the view that raiyats who paid their rent in kind, partially or entirely, were entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption under Section 50. The court referenced a series of decisions affirming this view, such as Thakooranee Dossee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee, Miterjeet Singh v. Toondun Singh, and Ram Dyal Singh v. Luchmee Narain. The court also discussed contrary opinions but concluded that the preponderance of judicial opinion supported the inclusion of rent in kind within the scope of Section 50. Reference to Legislative History and Reports for Statutory Interpretation: The respondents argued that the legislative history indicated an intention to exclude rent in kind from Section 50. They pointed to the omission of a specific clause during the legislative process that would have explicitly included rent in kind. However, the High Court held that reference to the Report of the Select Committee was not permissible for statutory interpretation. The court cited the Judicial Committee's ruling in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick, which excluded the consideration of legislative proceedings as aids to construction. The court emphasized that the final word of the legislature is the printed and published Act, and antecedent debates or amendments are not admissible for interpretation. Therefore, even if the legislative history was considered, it would not alter the interpretation that 'rent' in Section 50 includes rent in kind as defined in Section 3(5). Conclusion: The High Court concluded that the term 'rent' in Section 50 cannot be restricted to 'money-rent' and includes rent in kind as per Section 3(5). Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the suits were decreed with costs in all the courts. The hearing fee in the High Court was assessed at one gold mohur in each appeal.
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