1952 (3) TMI 58 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Issuance of a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner of Income-tax.
2. Interpretation of the limitation period under Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act.
3. Application of the rule of casus omissus.
4. Retrospective application of Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. Costs and merits of the case.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Issuance of a Writ of Mandamus:
Counsel moved for a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, regarding an order passed on June 6, 1948. The petitioner had filed a revision petition under Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act on November 26, 1947, which was dismissed as being barred by time on June 6, 1948. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application for review under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act, which was dismissed on September 22, 1951. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to challenge the order dated June 6, 1948.

2. Interpretation of the Limitation Period under Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act:
The petitioner argued that the limitation period should start from the date when the petitioner is notified of the order, relying on the judgment of the Madras High Court in Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras. However, the court referred to various sections of the Income-tax Act, such as Sections 31(5), 33(1), 33A(1), 35, 66, and 67A, which specify different starting points for the limitation period. The court concluded that the words "made within one year from the date of the order" in Section 33A(2) mean from the date of the order itself, not from the date of notification.

3. Application of the Rule of Casus Omissus:
The court discussed the principle of casus omissus, citing various legal precedents, including Mersey Docks v. Henderson, Crawford v. Spooner, and Whitely v. Chappele. The court emphasized that it cannot alter the language of the statute to supply omissions or defects. The court noted that the legislature intentionally used different wording in various sections of the Income-tax Act, indicating that the limitation period begins from the date of the order, not from the date of notification.

4. Retrospective Application of Article 226 of the Constitution:
The court referred to the case of Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, which held that Article 13 of the Constitution has no retrospective effect. Therefore, the powers conferred under Article 226 cannot affect orders passed before January 26, 1950. The court concluded that it does not have the power to interfere with orders passed before this date.

5. Costs and Merits of the Case:
The court addressed the merits of the case, noting that the Commissioner of Income-tax acted within the provisions of Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act. The court dismissed the petition and discharged the rule, awarding costs to the Commissioner of Income-tax with a counsel fee of Rs. 100.

Conclusion:
The petition for a writ of mandamus was dismissed as the court found no grounds to interfere with the Commissioner's order. The court upheld the interpretation that the limitation period under Section 33A(2) begins from the date of the order, not from the date of notification. The rule of casus omissus was not applicable, and the retrospective application of Article 226 was not permissible. The Commissioner of Income-tax was awarded costs.