9911796707
|
Home
Issues:
Interpretation of the period of limitation under section 33A for making an application by the assessee for revision. Detailed Analysis: The judgment of the Bombay High Court delves into the interpretation of the period of limitation provided under section 33A of the Income-tax Act for filing a revision application by the assessee. The crux of the matter revolves around whether the limitation period starts from the date of the order or from the date when the assessee becomes aware of the order. The contention raised by the Department is that limitation commences from the date of the order, while the assessee argues that it begins from the date of knowledge of the order. This discrepancy in interpretation is crucial in determining the timeliness of the revision application. The court scrutinizes the legislative intent behind the provision of limitation in section 33A. It emphasizes that if the Legislature grants the right of revision to the assessee, it must also ensure an effective and reasonable period for exercising that right. The court rejects the notion that an order can be deemed effective even if the party affected is unaware of its existence. It highlights the absurdity of allowing the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to unilaterally dictate the period of limitation by delaying the communication of the order. Such an interpretation would undermine the assessee's statutory right to appeal and the certainty of the limitation period. The judgment references precedents from other High Courts to support its interpretation. The Madras High Court's stance in Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax is cited, emphasizing that limitation should not commence before the party aggrieved is aware of the order. Conversely, the Punjab High Court's differing view in Mahabir Parshad v. Commissioner of Income-tax is discussed, where it contended that the language of the statute was clear and explicit, precluding any alteration by the court. However, the Bombay High Court distinguishes its interpretation by asserting that it does not seek to amend the statute but rather provide a reasonable construction to the term "order" as used by the Legislature. Ultimately, the Bombay High Court concludes that the Commissioner erred in deeming the revision application as time-barred. It asserts that the application was within the statutory limitation period and, therefore, directs the Commissioner to hear the petitioner's application. The court issues a mandamus against the Commissioner, compelling him to fulfill his statutory duty. The petition is allowed, the rule is made absolute, and costs are awarded to the petitioner, thereby resolving the issue in favor of the assessee.
|
