2019 (4) TMI 1911 - SC - Indian Laws

Bail application - Validity of dying declarations - suicide - whether we can convict the Accused only on the basis of these dying declarations? - HELD THAT - In a case of the present nature where the victim had 98% burns and the doctor has stated from the record that a painkiller was injected at 3.30 a.m. and the dying declaration had been recorded thereafter, there is a serious doubt whether the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. She was suffering from 98% burns. She must have been in great agony and once a sedative had been injected, the possibility of her being in a state of delusion cannot be completely ruled out. It would also be pertinent to mention that the endorsement made by the doctor that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the statement has been made not before the statement but after the statement was recorded. Normally it should be the other way round. No doubt, a dying declaration is an extremely important piece of evidence and where the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful, voluntary and not a result of any extraneous influence, the Court can convict the Accused only on the basis of a dying declaration. In the present case, there was some doubt as to whether the victim was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. No doubt, the doctor had stated that she was in a fit state of mind but he himself had, in his evidence, admitted that in the case of a victim with 98% burns, the shock may lead to delusion. Furthermore, the combined effect of the trauma with the administration of painkillers could lead to a case of possible delusion, and therefore, there is a need to look for corroborative evidence in the present case - The two Accused filed separate written statements Under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The defence was that the deceased was not willing to go to the village to look after her in-laws and, therefore, she committed suicide. The defence cannot be brushed aside. There are two factors which cast a grave doubt with regard to the prosecution story. As pointed out above, the prosecution story is that the Appellants-brother and sister, poured kerosene on the victim and set her on fire. It is the admitted case that the house in which the victim was residing with her husband consists of one room with a kitchen. It stands proved that the fire took place in the kitchen and not in the bedroom - Presumably, the second Appellant or any other person in the house had also gone with the victim. In the first room there was a cot, mattress, mosquito net, etc.. There was a kitchen in the adjoining area which had a separate privy and bathroom. There was a plastic container containing kerosene oil. There was smell of kerosene in the kitchen and there was water on the floor of the kitchen. A match box and some burnt cloth were also found in the kitchen. This proves that the occurrence took place in the kitchen and not in the bedroom. The second important factor which comes out from the statement of the panch witnesses is that in the first room in which there was a cot, there were two pillows on the cot and below a pillow there were some ornaments and other things. The panchanama report indicates that the ornaments were one yellow and black mangalsutra, a nathni (nose ring), some glass bangles and peinjan (an ornament worn on the foot). It is also recorded that, according to the accused, these ornaments belong to his wife. Mangalsutra, peinjan and even glass bangles are such ornaments which an Indian married woman would normally not remove. In Indian society these are normally worn by the ladies all the times. Therefore, the defence version that the deceased took off all these ornaments and then went to the kitchen and committed suicide cannot be totally ruled out. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. This finding of the trial court could not be said to be perverse. It was based on a proper appreciation of evidence. The trial court, after discussing the entire evidence in detail, had come to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court came to a different conclusion. On perusal of the entire evidence and the law on the subject, the trial court was right in holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant No. 1 is stated to be in jail. He shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Appellant No. 2 is on bail. Her bail bonds, if any, stand discharged - Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Conviction of the appellants under Section 302/498A IPC read with Section 34 IPC.
2. Reliability of dying declarations.
3. Appellate court's interference with the trial court's acquittal.
4. Evaluation of evidence and corroboration.
5. Fit state of mind of the deceased to make dying declarations.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Conviction of the appellants under Section 302/498A IPC read with Section 34 IPC:
The appellants were convicted by the High Court for offences punishable under Section 302 (murder) and Section 498A (cruelty by husband or his relatives) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 34 IPC (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court overturned the trial court's acquittal, finding the dying declarations reliable.

2. Reliability of dying declarations:
The deceased, Sharada, made two dying declarations: one to Dr. Sanjeev Chibbar (PW-5) and another to Mr. Kamlakar Adhav, Special Judicial Magistrate (PW-2). Dr. Chibbar recorded that Sharada stated she was set on fire by her husband and his sister. The Special Judicial Magistrate also recorded a similar statement. However, the Supreme Court noted the serious doubt regarding Sharada's mental state due to her 98% burns and the administration of painkillers, which could cause delusion. The endorsement of her mental fitness to make the statement was made after recording the declaration, which raised further doubts.

3. Appellate court's interference with the trial court's acquittal:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should not lightly interfere with the trial court's acquittal. The presumption of innocence is strengthened when an accused is acquitted by the trial court, and the appellate court must have substantial reasons to overturn such a decision. The principles laid down in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 were reiterated, emphasizing the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

4. Evaluation of evidence and corroboration:
The Supreme Court found that the trial court's decision was based on a proper appreciation of evidence. The trial court had acquitted the accused, giving them the benefit of doubt, mainly because the possibility of suicide could not be ruled out. The Supreme Court agreed that there was a need for corroborative evidence due to the doubts about the dying declarations. The non-examination of neighbors and the person who accompanied the accused to the hospital further weakened the prosecution's case.

5. Fit state of mind of the deceased to make dying declarations:
The Supreme Court questioned whether Sharada was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declarations due to her severe burn injuries and the administration of sedatives. The Court highlighted the importance of ensuring that a dying declaration is made voluntarily and without any influence. The combined effect of trauma and painkillers could lead to delusion, making it unsafe to rely solely on the dying declarations for conviction.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's acquittal. Appellant No. 1 was ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case, and Appellant No. 2's bail bonds were discharged. The Court emphasized the need for corroborative evidence in cases with serious doubts about the victim's mental state when making dying declarations.