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Issues Involved
1. Plaintiffs' right to recover rents realized by defendants. 2. Applicability of Article 109 of the Limitation Act. 3. Starting point of limitation for the plaintiffs' claim. 4. Equitable principles affecting the limitation period. 5. Cross-objection by the defendant regarding specific items. Detailed Analysis Plaintiffs' Right to Recover Rents Realized by Defendants The plaintiffs' predecessors purchased property in execution of a mortgage-decree on May 6, 1913. The sale was confirmed on January 28, 1914, after the judgment-debtor's application to set aside the sale was rejected. In the interim, the mortgagor executed usufructuary mortgages in favor of the defendants, who then realized rents from the tenants. The suit was brought to recover sums realized by the defendants as rent for the Baisakh and Bhadra kists of 1320 Fasli, which fell due after the plaintiffs' purchase. The plaintiffs' right to recover these rents has been finally determined in their favor. Applicability of Article 109 of the Limitation Act It is settled that Article 109 of the Limitation Act applies to this case. The learned Judge, after remand, found that some items were realized within three years of the suit and awarded the plaintiffs a decree for those amounts. However, the claim for other items was dismissed as they were received more than three years before the institution of the suit. Starting Point of Limitation for the Plaintiffs' Claim The starting point of limitation is the time when the amounts were received. The plaintiffs argued that the judgment-debtor's application to set aside the sale prevented the limitation period from starting. However, the court held that the plaintiffs had an inchoate right until the application was rejected and the sale confirmed. They could have instituted a suit during this period, although they could not have obtained a decree without the sale certificate. The court found no clause in the Limitation Act to support the plaintiffs' contention and emphasized that the terms of the Act are clear and definite. Equitable Principles Affecting the Limitation Period The plaintiffs invoked an equitable principle from the case of Ranee Surno Moyee v. Shoshee Mookhee Burmonia, arguing that their right to sue was suspended until the sale was confirmed. However, the court distinguished the facts of the present case from those in Ranee Surno Moyee's case. The court held that the principle invoked by the plaintiffs was enunciated for very different circumstances and could not be extended to this case without significantly qualifying Article 109. The court emphasized that the periods prescribed by the Limitation Act are founded on considerations of public policy and should not be extended based on individual hardship. Cross-Objection by the Defendant Regarding Specific Items The defendant raised a cross-objection concerning item No. 10, which appeared to be a mistake for item No. 3. The learned Pleader for the defendant admitted that there was a decree to warrant the finding regarding item No. 3, while there was no decree to show the realization of item No. 10. This adjustment reduced the defendant's liability by Rs. 57-4-0. No costs were awarded in the cross-objection. Conclusion The plaintiffs' appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the lower Appellate Court was confirmed with costs. The cross-objection by the defendant succeeded in rectifying the error regarding specific items, reducing the defendant's liability. The court emphasized that the terms of the Limitation Act must be strictly followed and that equitable principles cannot be invoked to extend the limitation period unless explicitly provided for in the Act.
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