1911 (9) TMI 1 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Construction of Exhibit A and whether the second defendant alone has a present title to the property.
2. Validity of the demise if the property belongs to the whole tarwad.
3. Whether the demise should be upheld for a lawful period if it is considered excessive.
4. Entitlement to compensation and demolition of the building constructed by the first defendant.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Construction of Exhibit A:

The primary issue was whether the second defendant alone had a present title to the property based on Exhibit A, a deed of gift executed by K. Govinda Manon in favor of Ammu Amma. The court examined the material terms of Exhibit A, which indicated that the properties were given to Ammu Amma and her santhanams (descendants) to be enjoyed forever. The court held that the properties were to be held with the incidents of tarwad property under Marumakattayam law, meaning they belonged to Ammu Amma and her children and the issue of her female children. The court referenced several precedents, including the Full Bench ruling in Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Rajee, which established that such gifts enure in favor of the donee and her children with the incidents of tarwad property. Thus, the second defendant could not claim exclusive entitlement to the property during her lifetime.

2. Validity of the Demise:

The second issue was whether the demise executed by the second defendant in favor of the first defendant was valid, even if the property belonged to the whole tarwad. The court found that a karnavan (senior male member) ordinarily cannot make an alienation for such a long period as sixty years without showing special necessity or benefit. Since no such justification was provided, the court held that the demise was beyond the powers of disposition of the second defendant and invalid.

3. Partial Upholding of the Demise:

The third issue was whether the demise, if considered excessive, should be upheld for a lawful period. The court rejected this contention, stating that upholding the demise for a portion of the term would necessitate making a new contract for the parties, which was not reasonable or intended by the original agreement. The court emphasized that the terms of the demise, including the payment for improvements at the end of sixty years, could not be altered to fit a shorter term.

4. Entitlement to Compensation and Demolition:

The fourth issue involved the construction of a building by the first defendant and whether he was entitled to compensation upon eviction. The court noted that the plaintiff objected to the demise and sought an interim injunction to prevent the building's construction, which was not granted as the construction had already begun. The court held that the first defendant, being a co-owner, did not act wrongfully in constructing the building. However, it was pointed out that the tarwad might need the land for future expansion, and the first defendant's actions could not be justified as they were not in the tarwad's best interest. The court also considered the first defendant's claim for compensation under the Malabar Tenants' Improvements Act but found that he could not claim bona fide belief in the second defendant's absolute ownership since he was aware of the plaintiff's objections and the tarwad's interest in the property.

Conclusion:

Both second appeals were dismissed with costs, affirming that the second defendant did not have exclusive rights to the property, the demise was invalid, and the first defendant was not entitled to compensation for the building constructed.