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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the tenant committed a default under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act by sending rent via money order that reached the landlord after the expiry of 30 days. Detailed Analysis: 1. Tenant's Default under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act: The primary issue was whether the tenant committed a default under Section 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act by sending the rent via money order that reached the landlord after the expiry of 30 days. The material facts reveal that the tenant, Munna Lal, was in arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 35 for the period from 25th November 1962 to 24th June 1963. The landlord served a notice on 23rd July 1963 demanding the arrears. The tenant remitted the amount by money order on 7th August 1963, but the money order was returned with an endorsement of refusal dated 26th August 1963. There was no evidence that the money order reached the landlord within the stipulated period of 30 days. The trial court decreed the suit for arrears and ejectment, holding that the tenant failed to pay the arrears within one month of the notice. The lower appellate court, however, presumed that the money order must have reached the landlord within the stipulated period and thus held that there was no default. In appeal, the single judge was inclined to accept that the tenant did not default in paying Rs. 89.75 but faced the decision in Govind Rao v. Kanhaiya Lal, which held that the post office is an agent of the remitter until the money is handed over to the payee. The single judge referred the matter to a larger bench due to doubts about this precedent. The Full Bench considered the statutory agency under Section 44 of the Indian Post Office Act, which recognizes the post office as the agent of the remitter. The Full Bench also reviewed the decision in Govind Rao v. Kanhaiya Lal and subsequent approvals, emphasizing that the post office remains the agent of the remitter until the money is paid to the payee. The Full Bench examined the principles from the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., which held that the post office could be an agent of the payee if there was an express or implied request to send money by post. The Full Bench concluded that if there is an implied request by the landlord for payment through a money order, the payment to the post office is considered payment to the payee unless countermanded under Section 44 of the Post Office Act. In the present case, the tenant informed the landlord via a registered letter that the arrears were being sent by money order, and the landlord did not object. The Full Bench held that the tenant had an implied authority to remit the rent by money order, and once the money was handed to the post office, the tenant was discharged of the obligation. Any delay in transit was beyond the tenant's control, and the landlord could not complain. Conclusion: The Full Bench answered the referred question by stating that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the tenant could not be said to have committed a default under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act in respect of the payment of Rs. 35, which he sent to the landlords by money order within time but which reached the landlords after the expiry of thirty days.
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