1992 (1) TMI 362 - HC - Companies Law

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the termination order.
2. Entitlement to regular appointment and salary in the regular pay scale.
3. Determination of whether the respondent Council is an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution.
4. Maintainability of the writ petition.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Termination Order:
The petitioner argued that his termination was unjustified as he was initially appointed following a regular selection process and was promised a regular appointment. He contended that he was forced to resign earlier with the assurance of future absorption, and upon reappointment, he was not issued a formal appointment letter and was paid daily wages instead of a regular salary. The petitioner claimed that his services were verbally terminated without proper procedure, which he challenged as a violation of his rights.

2. Entitlement to Regular Appointment and Salary in the Regular Pay Scale:
The petitioner asserted that he had a legitimate expectation of being appointed on a permanent basis and receiving a regular pay scale after being selected by a duly constituted selection committee. He highlighted the discriminatory treatment by pointing out that another individual, who was appointed later, was given a regular pay scale while he was not. This, he argued, violated his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

3. Determination of Whether the Respondent Council is an Instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution:
The respondents contended that the Council, being a registered company, was neither a State entity nor an instrumentality of the State. They argued that the Council was not created by the Government and did not perform any sovereign or public functions. They emphasized that the Council's activities were not controlled by the Government, and the financial assistance from the Government was not the sole source of its funding. The Court examined the Council's Memorandum and Articles of Association, noting the limited control exercised by the Government, which was primarily to ensure proper utilization of funds. The Court concluded that the Council did not meet the criteria established by the Supreme Court for being considered an instrumentality of the State.

4. Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that the Council was not a State or an instrumentality of the State, and therefore, no writ could be issued for the petitioner's re-employment or enforcement of fundamental rights. The Court agreed with this objection, noting that the Council's creation, functioning, and control did not qualify it as an "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition on this ground without addressing the merits of the petitioner's claims.

Conclusion:
The Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents, concluding that the respondent Council was not an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed, and the petitioner's claims regarding the validity of his termination, entitlement to regular appointment, and salary were not adjudicated on their merits.