1971 (3) TMI 131 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of acquisition proceedings under Sections 4, 6, 9, and 17(2)(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Whether the acquisition should have been conducted under Sections 38 to 44(b) of the Act for a company.
3. Justification for invoking Section 17 due to urgency.
4. Applicability of Section 17(2)(c) to the facts of the case.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Acquisition Proceedings:
The appellants challenged the validity of the acquisition proceedings under Sections 4, 6, 9, and 17(2)(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the Punjab Legislature. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, leading to the appeal. The notification under Section 4 was issued on March 14/17, 1969, for acquiring land for setting up a factory for manufacturing China-ware and Porcelain-ware. The notification invoked Section 17(2)(c) on grounds of urgency, bypassing Section 5A. The notification under Section 6 followed on March 18, 1969, and notices under Section 9 were served on March 28, 1969. The appellants filed the writ petition on April 8, 1969.

2. Acquisition for a Company:
The appellants contended that the acquisition should have been conducted under Sections 38 to 44(b) of the Act, as it was for a company. The counter-affidavit by the Deputy Director of Industries, Haryana, stated that the acquisition was for setting up a factory with collaboration from Pilkington Tiles Ltd. and was finalized and approved by authorities. The State Government contributed Rs. 100 towards the land cost, making it unnecessary to proceed under Part VII of the Act. The Court held that the acquisition was at "public expenses, for a public purpose," and the starting of a new industry was in public interest. The declaration under Section 6(3) was conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose, barring any colorable exercise of power.

3. Urgency Justifying Section 17:
The appellants argued there was no urgency justifying recourse to Section 17, thus depriving them of Section 5A benefits. The Government extended the project completion time to April 30, 1969, necessitating immediate steps for land acquisition. The Court found that the urgency was justified, emphasizing that the conclusion of urgency by the Government was entitled to weight, if not conclusive. The lethargy of the State Government or the concerned party at an earlier stage was deemed irrelevant.

4. Applicability of Section 17(2)(c):
The appellants denied the land was waste or arable, thus not falling under Section 17(1). The State acted under Section 17(2)(c), which allows bypassing Section 5A if the land is required for a public purpose of urgent importance. The Court examined whether the ejusdem generis rule should apply to Section 17(2)(c). It concluded that Section 17(2)(c) was plain and unambiguous, allowing the Government to bypass Section 5A for urgent public purposes. The conditions precedent for Section 17(2)(c) were met: the land was required for a public purpose, and the Government deemed it of urgent importance. The ejusdem generis rule did not apply as the specific words in Sections 17(2)(a) and (b) did not constitute a category, class, or genus.

Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs. The Court upheld the validity of the acquisition proceedings, justified the urgency under Section 17, and confirmed the applicability of Section 17(2)(c) without invoking the ejusdem generis rule.