2021 (5) TMI 1003 - SC - Indian Laws

Seeking grant of anticipatory bail - Appellant s daughter died under suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home - complaint registered under Sections 304B and 498A Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 - Appellant s brother and the latter s two sons were attacked by the Respondents due to a dispute between the parties relating to encroachment of land - whether the High Court while dismissing the anticipatory bail applications of the Respondents could have granted them protection from arrest? HELD THAT - The considerations on the basis of which the Court is to exercise its discretion to grant relief Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure have been decided by this Court in a catena of judgments and needs no restatement - A Court be it a Sessions Court or a High Court in certain special facts and circumstances may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a limited period of time. The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so which would be assailable before a superior Court. To do so without giving reasons would be contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in SUSHILA AGGARWAL AND OTHERS VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER 2020 (1) TMI 1193 - SUPREME COURT . If the High Court had therefore decided to allow the anticipatory bail application of the Respondents-Accused herein albeit for a limited period of 90 days the task before this Court would have been somewhat easier. It is no longer res integra that any interpretation of the provisions of Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure has to take into consideration the fact that the grant or rejection of an application Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure has a direct bearing on the fundamental right to life and liberty of an individual. The genesis of this jurisdiction lies in Article 21 of the Constitution as an effective medium to protect the life and liberty of an individual. The provision therefore needs to be read liberally and considering its beneficial nature the Courts must not read in limitations or restrictions that the legislature have not explicitly provided for. Any ambiguity in the language must be resolved in favour of the applicant seeking relief - If the proviso to Section 438(1) Code of Criminal Procedure does not act as a bar to the grant of additional protection to the applicant the question still remains as to under what provision of law the Court may issue relief to an applicant after dismissing their anticipatory bail application. The Court must take into account the statutory scheme Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure particularly the proviso to Section 438(1) Code of Criminal Procedure and balance the concerns of the investigating agency complainant and the society at large with the concerns/interest of the applicant. Therefore such an order must necessarily be narrowly tailored to protect the interests of the applicant while taking into consideration the concerns of the investigating authority. Such an order must be a reasoned one - the impugned orders passed by the High Court in the present appeals do not meet any of the standards as laid out above. It is for the following reasons firstly after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application on the basis of the nature and gravity of the offence the High Court has granted the impugned relief to the Respondents without assigning any reasons. Secondly in granting the relief for a period of 90 days the Court has seemingly not considered the concerns of the investigating agency complainant or the proviso Under Section 438(1) Code of Criminal Procedure which necessitates that the Court pass such an exceptional discretionary protection order for the shortest duration that is reasonably required. A period of 90 days or three months cannot in any way be considered to be a reasonable one in the present facts and circumstances. The resultant effect of the High Court s orders is that neither are the Respondents found entitled to pre-arrest bail nor can they be arrested for a long duration - appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court, while dismissing the anticipatory bail applications of the Respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest.
2. Interpretation of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) regarding anticipatory bail.
3. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the High Court, while dismissing the anticipatory bail applications of the Respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest:
The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had the authority to grant protection from arrest to the Respondents after dismissing their anticipatory bail applications. The High Court had dismissed the anticipatory bail applications of the Respondents but granted them 90 days to surrender before the Trial Court and seek regular bail, protecting them from coercive action during this period. The Appellants contended that once the High Court declined the final relief of pre-arrest bail, it could not grant any further protection, as Section 438 CrPC does not contemplate such protection post-dismissal of the application.

2. Interpretation of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) regarding anticipatory bail:
The Supreme Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), which clarified the extent of power exercisable by Courts under Section 438 CrPC. The Court held that anticipatory bail should not be limited to a fixed period and should subsist till the end of the trial unless specific conditions warrant otherwise. However, the Supreme Court noted that the High Court had rejected the Respondents' anticipatory bail applications based on the gravity and severity of the accusations but still granted them protection, which was not in accordance with the principles laid out in Sushila Aggarwal.

3. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC:
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the High Court has inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to pass orders to secure the ends of justice. This provision allows the High Court to ensure justice in exceptional circumstances even if the anticipatory bail application is rejected. The Court emphasized that such discretionary power must be exercised judiciously, balancing the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant, and the applicant, and must be supported by reasons.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's orders granting 90 days of protection to the Respondents without assigning reasons and without considering the concerns of the investigating agency and the complainant were not legally sustainable. The Court held that such protection orders should be narrowly tailored and for the shortest duration necessary, and the High Court's grant of 90 days was excessive. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders, allowing the investigating agency to proceed according to law and complete the investigation. The Supreme Court's decision underscores the necessity of reasoned and balanced judicial discretion in granting protective orders post-dismissal of anticipatory bail applications.