1981 (1) TMI 291 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the appellant's election under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
2. Effect of subsequent acquittal on disqualification due to conviction and sentence.
3. Applicability of Section 100(1)(a) versus Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act.
4. Interpretation of the term "disqualified" under the Act and the Constitution.
5. Impact of the date of scrutiny of nominations on the disqualification.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the appellant's election under the Representation of the People Act, 1951:

The primary question was whether the election of a candidate, whose conviction and sentence exceeding two years were pending appeal at the time of nomination scrutiny, could be declared void under Section 100(1) of the Act. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had declared the appellant's election void, leading to this appeal.

2. Effect of subsequent acquittal on disqualification due to conviction and sentence:

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment exceeding two years. However, his conviction was quashed by the Supreme Court during the pendency of the election petition. The Court held that the acquittal retrospectively wiped out the conviction and sentence, making it as if the conviction never existed. This principle was supported by the precedent in Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal, where it was stated, "An order of acquittal particularly one passed on merits wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes, and as effectively as if it had never been passed."

3. Applicability of Section 100(1)(a) versus Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act:

The respondent initially challenged the election under both Section 100(1)(a) and Section 100(1)(d)(i). However, during arguments, the challenge under Section 100(1)(a) was given up, and the case was pressed only under Section 100(1)(d)(i). The Court noted that the primary question was whether the appellant was disqualified at the date of scrutiny of the nomination papers, which would determine if his nomination was properly accepted by the Returning Officer.

4. Interpretation of the term "disqualified" under the Act and the Constitution:

The Court examined the definition of "disqualified" under Section 7(b) of the Act and Article 102 of the Constitution. It was argued that the term "disqualified" should be interpreted to include the entire election process, from nomination to the declaration of results. However, the Court held that the disqualification must be judged with reference to the date of the election, as per Section 67A, which defines the date of election as the date on which a candidate is declared elected.

5. Impact of the date of scrutiny of nominations on the disqualification:

The Court emphasized that under Section 36(2)(a), the crucial date for determining disqualification is the date of scrutiny of nominations. However, it concluded that the subsequent acquittal of the appellant by the Supreme Court during the pendency of the election petition retrospectively annulled the disqualification, making it non-existent even at the date of scrutiny. The Court stated, "The acquittal of the appellant before the decision of the election-petition pending in the High Court, had, with retrospective effect, made his disqualification non-existent, even at the date of the scrutiny of nominations."

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and dismissed the election petition of the respondent. The Court held that the appellant's subsequent acquittal retrospectively wiped out his disqualification, rendering his nomination valid. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.