2014 (8) TMI 1220 - SC - Indian Laws

Partition of suit property - Whether the plaintiff No. 1 and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 are entitled for partition of the suit schedule properties as they have been excluded from the possession of the properties by ouster by the sons of deceased Valli namely, Kunhan and Ayyappan for more than 50 years from the date of her death? - whether they have lost their right by adverse possession of the defendant Nos. 1 to 9 by ouster and their claim is barred by limitation? - HELD THAT - The nature of the property, the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the kind of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising, are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for attracting applicability of the doctrine of adverse possession. The right in the property ought to be one which is alienable and is capable of being acquired by the competitor. Adverse possession operates on an alienable right. The right stands alienated by operation of law, for it was capable of being alienated voluntarily and is sought to be recognised by the doctrine of adverse possession as having been alienated involuntarily, by default and inaction on the part of the rightful claimant, who knows actually or constructively of the wrongful acts of the competitor and yet sits idle. Such inaction or default in taking care of one s own rights over property is also capable of being called a manner of dealing with one s property which results in extinguishing one s title in property and vesting the same in the wrongdoer in possession of property and thus amounts to transfer of immovable property in the wider sense assignable in the context of social welfare legislation enacted with the object of protecting a weaker section. The High Court held that the daughters of Valli alone would be entitled to the suit properties but the Trial Court has held on the basis of evidence on record that they were excluded from possession by their brothers for more than 50 years from the date of death of Valli. Hence, their rights, if any, are lost by adverse possession and by ouster and their claim is barred by limitation. In the absence of averments in the plaint regarding custom followed in the marriage of the daughters of Valli and that their marriage was not in Kudivaippu form therefore, can their rights be excluded upon the suit schedule properties of Valli as per customs prevalent in their community under the Hindu Law? - HELD THAT - In the absence of evidence on record to show that they were not ousted from possession from the suit schedule properties and that they have been in joint possession of the same with their deceased brothers during their life time and thereafter with their legal representatives as the co- sharers, the finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court on this aspect of the case cannot be disputed with. The defendant Nos. 1 to 9 have stated that the daughters of deceased Valli were married in the Kudivaippu form. However, they have failed to prove the same. However, the Trial Court has recorded its finding on the contentious issue No. 4 in favour of the defendant Nos. 1 to 9 on the basis of undisputed facts and evidence on record, it has rightly held that the above defendants have perfected their title to the suit schedule properties by way of adverse possession by ouster of the plaintiff No. 1 and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 from the said properties, which finding of fact is accepted by us by recording our own reasons in this judgment - the daughters of Valli are excluded from their rights upon the suit schedule properties of Valli and are not entitled for the share as claimed by them in their suit. Whether the partition deed (Ex.-B1) in the year 1953 is binding between the deceased Kunhan and Ayyappan in view of the litigation between them as per documents (B-2 to B-4) in respect to the suit schedule properties of Valli? - HELD THAT - This point is also required to be answered in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 9 - There was litigation between the fathers of the defendant Nos. 1 to 9 in relation to the said partition, no doubt, the father of the defendant Nos. 8 and 9 failed in the aforesaid civil litigation as per the documentary evidence-Exs.-B2 to B4. Therefore, the same is binding on the father of defendant Nos. 8 and 9. Whether the plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 are entitled for their share in the suit properties? - HELD THAT - The defendant Nos. 1 to 9 placing reliance upon the purchase certificates Exs.-B5 and B6 have no relevance to the fact situation. Therefore, the plea urged by them in this regard is wholly untenable in law for the reason that they are neither cultivating tenants nor deemed tenants of the suit schedule properties as there is no evidence produced by them in this regard in the Original Suit. Therefore, the purchase certificates which were obtained by their deceased fathers from the Land Tribunal have no relevance to the facts of the case. Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit schedule properties of Valli are Stridhan properties.
2. Whether the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 are entitled to partition of the suit schedule properties.
3. Whether the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 have lost their right by adverse possession and ouster by defendant Nos. 1 to 9.
4. Whether the absence of averments in the plaint regarding custom followed in the marriage of Valli's daughters affects their rights to the suit schedule properties.
5. Whether the partition deed (Ex.-B1) in 1953 is binding.
6. Whether plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4 are entitled to their share in the suit properties.
7. What relief the parties are entitled to.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Stridhan Properties:
The Supreme Court analyzed whether the suit schedule properties of Valli are Stridhan properties. It was determined that the properties are indeed Stridhan, as per Ex.-A1 (Panayam Theeradharam) and the commentary by N.R. Raghavachariyar on Hindu Law. The High Court did not record a positive finding that the Stridhan properties of Valli exclusively belonged to her daughters. However, it was established that the properties were Stridhan, which generally entitled her daughters to exclusive rights over them.

2. Entitlement to Partition:
The plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 claimed entitlement to partition of the suit schedule properties. The Trial Court dismissed their claim, holding that they were not entitled to partition. The High Court reversed this, directing the division of the properties. However, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 had been excluded from possession for over 50 years, thus losing their rights by adverse possession and ouster by defendant Nos. 1 to 9. The High Court's finding was erroneous, and the Trial Court's decision was upheld.

3. Adverse Possession and Ouster:
The Supreme Court concluded that the continuous possession of the suit schedule properties by defendant Nos. 1 to 9 for over 50 years constituted adverse possession and ouster of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17. This was supported by legal precedents, including Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and Sunder Das v. Gajananrao, which clarified the principles of adverse possession.

4. Custom and Marriage:
The plaintiffs did not plead the custom regarding the marriage of Valli's daughters. The High Court erred in not addressing this fact. The defendants' claim that the daughters were given Streedhana at marriage and thus not entitled to a share was not supported by evidence. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 failed to establish necessary aspects for partition, as they were ousted from possession.

5. Partition Deed (Ex.-B1):
The partition deed of 1953 between Kunhan and Ayyappan was binding. The continuous possession by their descendants (defendant Nos. 1 to 9) further solidified their claim. The High Court's reversal of the Trial Court's findings on this issue was incorrect.

6. Entitlement of Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4:
Plaintiff Nos. 2 to 4, being the legal representatives of deceased Apputty, were not entitled to a share in the suit properties. The properties were Stridhan, and after Valli's death, they came into the possession of her sons, Kunhan and Ayyappan, as per the partition deed.

7. Relief:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of defendant Nos. 1 to 9, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Trial Court's judgment. The plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 were not entitled to the relief sought.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the suit schedule properties were Stridhan, and the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 10 to 17 lost their rights due to adverse possession and ouster by defendant Nos. 1 to 9. The High Court's judgment was reversed, and the Trial Court's decision was reinstated.