9911796707
|
Home
Issues involved: Interpretation of notice of demand u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding the timeline for receipt of the notice by the drawer.
1. Notice of Demand Timeline: The case deliberates on whether the notice under proviso (b) to Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act must be received by the drawer within 30 days or if it suffices for the notice to be dispatched within the stipulated period. The court examines if the expression "by giving a notice in writing...within thirty days of the receipt of information" necessitates the notice to ensure receipt within 30 days. Reference is made to the Madhu v. Omega Pipes Ltd. case where it was discussed if the notice must be dispatched reasonably ahead of the expiry of fifteen days to comply with the statutory requirement. The facts of the case involve a dishonored cheque and the issuance of a notice of demand, raising questions about the sufficiency of the notice sent on 1/6/05 and received on 4/6/05. 2. Legal Provisions: Provisos (b) and (c) to Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are highlighted, emphasizing the requirements for the payee or holder to demand payment from the drawer within specific timelines. The clauses outline the conditions for the notice of demand and the subsequent failure of the drawer to make payment within the stipulated period. 3. Interpretation of "Giving Notice": The judgment references the Madhu v. Omega Pipes Ltd. case to analyze the distinction between "giving notice" and the actual receipt of the notice by the drawer. The court discusses the practical interpretation of the expression "giving notice" in the context of dispatching the notice within the statutory period, as opposed to ensuring its receipt within the same timeframe. 4. Conclusion: The court concludes that under proviso (b) to Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the notice must be dispatched within 30 days, and if sent before the expiry of this period via post or courier, it fulfills the legal requirement. It is emphasized that the date of giving the notice is crucial, not the date of receipt, in determining compliance with the statutory provisions. Consequently, the petition to quash the prosecution under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. is dismissed based on the interpretation of the notice timeline requirements.
|
