2017 (3) TMI 1908 - SC - Indian Laws

Restitution of conjugal rights was rejected - decree for dissolution of marriage in favour of the Respondent (husband) granted - permission for divorce - respondent claimed cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 entitling him to claim dissolution of marriage against the Appellant - HELD THAT - The word cruelty used in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act is not defined under the Act. However, this expression was the subject matter of interpretation in several cases of this Court. What amounts to mental cruelty was succinctly explained by this Court (three Judge Bench) in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh 2007 (3) TMI 826 - SUPREME COURT Their Lordships speaking through Justice Dalveer Bhandari observed that no uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet it is appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behavior which may be considered relevant in dealing with the cases of mental cruelty . Keeping in view the law laid down in Samar Ghosh's case, when we examine the grounds taken by the Respondent in his petition for proving the mental cruelty for grant of divorce against the Appellant, we find that none of the grounds satisfies either individually or collectively the test laid down in Samar Ghosh's case so as to entitle the Respondent to claim a decree of divorce. A petition seeking divorce on some isolated incidents alleged to have occurred 8-10 years prior to filing of the date of petition cannot furnish a subsisting cause of action to seek divorce after 10 years or so of occurrence of such incidents. The incidents alleged should be of recurring nature or continuing one and they should be in near proximity with the filing of the petition - Few isolated incidents of long past and that too found to have been condoned due to compromising behavior of the parties cannot constitute an act of cruelty within the meaning of Section 13 (1)(ia) of the Act. Both the Courts below failed to take note of this material aspect of the case and thus committed jurisdictional error in passing a decree for dissolution of marriage - We cannot, therefore, countenance the approach of the High Court because it did not, in the first instance, examine the grounds taken in the petition to find out as to whether such grounds constitute mental cruelty or not? The finding, therefore, though concurrent does not bind this Court. In the first place, the Respondent did not seek a decree of dissolution of marriage on these grounds. Second, the grounds of cruelty taken by the Respondent in his petition does not include these grounds. Third, even if some stray allegations were made by the wife in her pleading/evidence as were relied upon by the learned Counsel are of no relevance because, as mentioned above, these ground were not pleaded in the petition by the Respondent for seeking a decree of divorce and nor were put in issue; and lastly, the burden being on the Respondent, the same could be discharged by the Respondent by pleading and then proving. It was not so done. It is for these reasons, we cannot accept the aforementioned two submissions for affirming the decree of divorce. The Appellant is entitled for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against the Respondent - from perusal of the evidence that it is the Respondent who withdrew from the Appellant's company without there being any reasonable cause to do so. Now that we have held on facts that the Respondent failed to make out any case of cruelty against the Appellant, it is clear to us that it was the Respondent who withdrew from the company of the Appellant without reasonable cause and not the vice versa. The impugned judgment is set aside. As a result, the petition filed by the Respondent (husband) Under Section 13(1) of the Act seeking dissolution of marriage is dismissed - Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Respondent (husband) treated the Appellant (wife) with cruelty.
2. Whether the Petitioner (husband) is entitled to a decree of divorce.
3. Whether the Appellant (wife) is entitled to restitution of conjugal rights.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the Respondent (husband) treated the Appellant (wife) with cruelty:

The Respondent filed a petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, primarily on the grounds of "cruelty." He cited nine instances, including the Appellant's behavior on the day after marriage, on New Year's Eve, her lack of enthusiasm for family functions, her insistence on living separately from his parents, and her alleged misbehavior with his family and friends. However, the Appellant denied these allegations and sought restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Act, claiming that the Respondent had withdrawn from her company without reasonable cause.

2. Whether the Petitioner (husband) is entitled to a decree of divorce:

The Family Court initially granted the decree for dissolution of marriage, concluding that the grounds alleged by the Respondent amounted to mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act. The High Court upheld this decision. However, upon further review, the Supreme Court found that none of the grounds individually or collectively met the test of "mental cruelty" as established in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh [(2007) 4 SCC 511]. The incidents cited were either stale, isolated, or lacked sufficient detail. Moreover, any acts of alleged cruelty were deemed to have been condoned by the subsequent conduct of the parties, as they continued to live together and had a second child in 2006. The Supreme Court emphasized that isolated incidents from the distant past, especially those deemed condoned, could not constitute an act of cruelty sufficient to grant a divorce.

3. Whether the Appellant (wife) is entitled to restitution of conjugal rights:

The Supreme Court found that the Appellant was entitled to restitution of conjugal rights. It concluded that the Respondent had withdrawn from the Appellant's company without reasonable cause. Since the Respondent failed to establish any valid grounds of cruelty against the Appellant, it was clear that the Respondent's withdrawal was unjustified. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the Appellant's petition for restitution of conjugal rights.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned order and dismissing the Respondent's divorce petition. The Court granted the Appellant's petition for restitution of conjugal rights, emphasizing that the Respondent must fulfill his obligations as a caretaker of his family. The Court expressed hope that the parties would reconcile and fulfill their duties towards each other and their daughters, fostering peace and harmony within the family.