1979 (4) TMI 177 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Nature of the estate acquired by Nataraja Pillai under the Will.
2. Applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
3. Construction of Clause 5 of the Will.
4. Determination of heirs and their shares.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Nature of the Estate Acquired by Nataraja Pillai:
The trial court found that Nataraja Pillai acquired only a life estate in the properties mentioned in Schedule I of the Plaint. Upon his death without male issue, the properties were to revert to the heirs of the testator, Palaniandi Pillai, as if on intestacy.

2. Applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956:
The trial court ruled that the plaintiff, Krishnammal, could not invoke Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The High Court, however, held that the ascertainment of the heirs of the testator should be done according to the Hindu Law prevailing at the time of the testator's death in 1928, and not according to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

3. Construction of Clause 5 of the Will:
The High Court interpreted Clause 5 of the Will to mean that the testator created an "artificial" class of ultimate residuary legatees, referred to as "my heirs." This class of legatees would only acquire a vested interest if Nataraja Pillai died without male issue. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the term "my heirs" should be construed in its legal sense, meaning the testator's legal heirs under the law of inheritance. The Court clarified that the testator did not intend to deviate from the Hindu Law of intestate succession.

4. Determination of Heirs and Their Shares:
The Supreme Court held that the heirs of the testator, on whom the estate was to devolve in the event of Nataraja dying sonless, were to be ascertained according to the Hindu Law of intestate succession in force at the time of Nataraja's death (January 31, 1957). This meant applying the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently, the plaintiff, as the widow of a predeceased son, and the defendants were all heirs falling in Class I of the Schedule referred to in Section 8 of the Act. The distribution of the property would follow the rules in Sections 9 and 10 of the Act, giving the plaintiff a 1/3rd share and the remaining 2/3rd share to be equally distributed among the branches of Ramaswami and Vadivelu.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and decreed a partition for the plaintiff's 1/3rd share in the suit property, while the remaining 2/3rd share was to be distributed equally among the branches of the defendants. The parties were left to bear their own costs.