2015 (3) TMI 1434 - HC - Indian Laws

Dismissal of revision application - Sale deed executed in March 2000 and the notice issued by respondent No. 3 in October 2003 - revision applications are not entertained and are rejected because the said applications have been filed after prescribed period of limitation expired (i.e. after 90 days) - HELD THAT - A provision conferring statutory right and thereby providing a remedy against the order by adjudicating authority, either in form of appeal or revision application, should be construed to make the remedy effective and meaningful and cannot be interpreted and enforced in a manner which will curtail the scope of remedy and may virtually render it ornamental or truncated than what the legislature actually provided for. When the person is not even aware that some decision is taken and order is passed and / or when the person is not aware about the actual decision i.e. contents of the order, he cannot effectively and meaningfully avail the remedy provided under the Act. Unless the person has the knowledge about the order the provisions / remedy will be meaningless. Therefore, the said provision i.e. Section 53 of the Act and more particularly the expression from the date of the order must be construed to make the provision and the remedy effective and meaningful and not in a manner which would restrict the period of said remedy's availability i.e. the period for which the remedy would be effectively available to the concerned and affected person. An order to become effective and operational, the order and decision should be informed to the concerned person and he should be aware about the decision of the authority and also about the direction. As observed by Hon ble Apex Court in State of Punjab vs Amar Singh Harika 1966 (1) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT an authority may pass and sign an order and such order may be retained on file without communicating and forwarding it to the concerned person. The knowledge that an order is passed as well as knowledge about the actual decision and effect of the decision are imperative for calculating and enforcing the limitation prescribed (for filing application under Section 53 of the Act) by the Act. The petitioner dispatched the revision applications to the competent authority on 10.9.2014 which was received (according to the claim by the respondents) in the office of the respondents on 15.9.2014 and the petitioner deposited 25% of adjudicated amount on 6.9.2014. Thus, the amount required to be deposited in light of clause-B of sub-section (1) of Section 15 was deposited by the petitioners even before the memo of applications were received in the office of revisional authority - In this view of the matter the period of limitation i.e. period of 90 days should have been calculated w.e.f. 19.6.2014. The revisional authority has committed error in considering the revision applications filed by the petitioners as bared by limitation prescribed under the Act inasmuch as calculating the period on from 1st terminus to 2nd terminus i.e. from 19.6.2014 to 15.9.2014 it becomes clear that the revision applications are undisputedly filed before expiry of 90th day and that therefore the revision applications filed by the petitioners could not have been treated as barred by period of limitation prescribed under the Act and consequently the applications could not have been dismissed. The impugned orders deserve to be and are accordingly hereby set aside and the matters are remitted to the revisional authority for considering the revision applications on merits - Petition disposed off.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the rejection of the petitioners' appeals on the ground of limitation.
2. Interpretation of the term "date of the order" under Section 53 of the Bombay Stamp Act.
3. Consideration of the date of communication of the order for calculating the limitation period.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Rejection of the Petitioners' Appeals on the Ground of Limitation:
The petitioners argued that their revision applications were filed within the prescribed limitation period. They claimed that the impugned orders were received on 19.6.2014, and the applications were filed on 13.9.2014/15.9.2014. The respondents, however, considered the date of the order (16.6.2014) as the starting point for calculating the limitation period, leading to the applications being deemed filed on the 92nd day, thus barred by limitation. The court emphasized the need to consider the date of communication of the order to the petitioners rather than the date of the order itself for calculating the limitation period.

2. Interpretation of the Term "Date of the Order" under Section 53 of the Bombay Stamp Act:
The court examined Section 53 of the Bombay Stamp Act, which states that an application must be presented within 90 days "from the date of the order." The respondents interpreted this to mean the date the order was passed. However, the court noted that such an interpretation could frustrate the object of the Act and the intention of the legislature. The court held that the term "date of the order" should be construed to mean the date when the order is communicated to the concerned party, ensuring the remedy provided by the Act is meaningful and effective.

3. Consideration of the Date of Communication of the Order for Calculating the Limitation Period:
The court highlighted the importance of the date of communication of the order to the concerned party. It referred to Rule 7 of the Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value of Property) Rules, 1984, which prescribes the manner of service of any notice or order. The court emphasized that the respondents could not attribute knowledge of the decision to the petitioners before 19.6.2014, the date the order was dispatched. The court cited several Supreme Court judgments, including D. Saibaba vs. Bar Council of India and Housing Board Haryana vs. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association, to support the view that the limitation period should commence from the date of communication of the order.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the respondents erred in calculating the limitation period from the date of the order rather than the date of communication. It held that the revision applications were filed within the prescribed period when calculated from the date of communication. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matters were remitted to the revisional authority for consideration on merits. The court clarified that it had not entered into the merits of the petitioners' claims and directed the revisional authority to independently decide the cases in accordance with the law. The petitions were partly allowed, and the rule was made absolute to the extent indicated.