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2020 (10) TMI 1379 - SC - Indian LawsRight to residence in shared household being the matrimonial home - Interpretation and working of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 - decreeing the suit filed by the Plaintiff for mandatory and permanent injunction - Order XI Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure. Whether definition of shared household Under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 has to be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of joint family or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share? - Whether judgment of this Court in SR. BATRA ANR. VERSUS TARUNA BATRA 2006 (12) TMI 487 - SUPREME COURT has not correctly interpreted the provision of Section 2(s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 and does not lay down a correct law? - HELD THAT - There being specific pleading on behalf of the Respondent that the house which is in the name of the Appellant is the matrimonial home of the Respondent where she was residing in first floor since her marriage. The fact that Respondent is residing in first floor of the premises is not matter of dispute. Even if the house is in the name of the Appellant and that even if we accept the case of the Appellant that Appellant s son Raveen has no share in the house belonging to Appellant with whom the Respondent was living in the domestic relationship whether the Respondent is entitled to reside in the premises in question as shared household is the question to be answered. In the impugned judgment Delhi High Court has refrained from deciding the point as to whether suit property is a shared household on the ground that the application filed Under Section 12 of Act 2005 by the Respondent is pending. In the suit filed by the Appellant where Respondent has pleaded and claimed that it is shared household and she has right to live and it was on that ground she was resisting the suit for mandatory injunction the question that whether the suit property is a shared household or not becomes relevant and necessary and the said issue cannot be skipped on the ground that application under D.V. Act is pending. The right to residence Under Section 19 is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared household especially when the daughter-in-law is pitted against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. The senior citizens in the evening of their life are also entitled to live peacefully not haunted by marital discord between their son and daughter-in-law. While granting relief both in application Under Section 12 of Act 2005 or in any civil proceedings the Court has to balance the rights of both the parties. The directions issued by High court in paragraph 56 adequately balances the rights of both the parties. The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share - The judgment of this Court in SR. BATRA ANR. VERSUS TARUNA BATRA 2006 (12) TMI 487 - SUPREME COURT has not correctly interpreted Section 2(s) of Act 2005 and the judgment does not lay down a correct law. Whether the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that suit filed by the Appellant could not have been decreed Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure? - Whether when the Defendant in her written statement pleaded that suit property is her shared household and she has right to residence therein the Trial Court could have decreed the suit of the Plaintiff without deciding such claim of Defendant which was permissible to be decided as per Section 26 of the Act 2005? - HELD THAT - What is required to be considered is what constitutes the admission warranting the judgment on admission in exercise of powers Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure. This Court had occasion to consider above in decisions Himani Alloys Limited v. Tata Steel Limited 2011 (7) TMI 1344 - SUPREME COURT and S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj 2015 (8) TMI 1563 - SUPREME COURT . In Himani Alloys Limited this Court had an occasion to consider the scope and ambit of judgment on admission in exercise of powers Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure. It is observed and held in paragraph 11 that being an enabling provision it is neither mandatory nor preemptory but discretionary for the Court to pass judgment on admission in exercise of powers Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure. It is observed that the Court on examination of the facts and circumstances has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the Defendant by way of an appeal on merits. A similar view was expressed by this Court in the case of S.M. Asif. It is observed and held in paragraph 8 that expression may in Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure suggests that it is discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right. It is further observed that where Defendants raised objections which go to root of the case it would not be appropriate to exercise discretion Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure. The power Under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In the facts of the present case the Trial Court ought not to have given judgment Under Order XII Rule 6 on the admission of the Defendant as contained in her application filed Under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. Thus there are more than one reason for not approving the course of action adopted by Trial Court in passing the judgment Under Order XII Rule 6. We thus concur with the view of the High Court that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court given Under Order XII Rule 6 is unsustainable. Whether the Plaintiff in the suit giving rise to this appeal can be said to be the Respondent as per definition of Section 2(q) of Act 2005? - HELD THAT - One of the conditions to treat a person as a Respondent is that against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act . The Defendant in her pleadings having claimed that she has right of residence in the suit property she for successful resisting the suit has to plead and prove that she has been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the Respondent which is implicit in the definition of the aggrieved person itself as given in the Section 2(a) of the Act 2005. It is further relevant to notice that although learned Magistrate passed an interim order in the application filed by the Defendant Under Section 12 on 26.11.2016 but said order was interim order which was passed on the satisfaction of the Magistrate that the application prima facie disclosed that the Respondent is committing or has committed an act of domestic violence . For granting any relief by the Civil Court Under Section 19 it has to be proved that the Respondent is committing or has committed an act of domestic violence on the aggrieved person. To treat a person as the Respondent for purposes of Section 2(q) it has to be proved that person arrayed as Respondent has committed an act of domestic violence on the aggrieved person. For the purposes of determination of right of Defendant Under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 in the suit in question the Plaintiff can be treated as Respondent but for the grant of any relief to the Defendant or for successful resisting the suit of the Plaintiff necessary conditions for grant of relief as prescribed under the Act 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by the Defendant only then the relief can be granted by the Civil Court to the Defendant. What is the meaning and extent of the expression save in accordance with the procedure established by law as occurring in Section 17(2) of Act 2005? - HELD THAT - The expression save in accordance with the procedure established by law in Section 17(2) of the Act 2005 contemplates the proceedings in court of competent jurisdiction. Thus suit for mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or possession by the owner of the property is maintainable before a Competent Court. We may further notice that in Sub-section (2) the injunction is shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household save in accordance with procedure established by law . Thus the provision itself contemplates adopting of any procedure established by law by the Respondent for eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the shared household. Thus in appropriate case the competent court can decide the claim in a properly instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women need to be excluded or evicted from the shared household - The High Court in the impugned judgment has also expressed opinion that suit filed by the Plaintiff cannot be held to be non-maintainable with which conclusion we are in agreement. In case the shared household of a woman is a tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/allotment/license is in the name of husband father-in-law or any other relative the Act 2005 does not operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating an appropriate proceedings for eviction of the tenant/allottee/licensee qua the shared household. However in case the proceedings are due to any collusion between the two the woman who is living in the shared household has right to resist the proceedings on all grounds which the tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in the proceedings. The embargo Under Section 17(2) of Act 2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in accordance with the procedure established by law operates only against the Respondent i.e. one who is Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of Act 2005. Whether the husband of aggrieved party (Defendant) is necessary party in the suit filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant? - HELD THAT - When the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court Trial Court s discretion ought not to have been fettered by issuing such a general direction as noted above. The general direction issued in paragraph 56(i) is capable of being misinterpreted. Whether the husband of an aggrieved person in a particular case needs to be added as Plaintiff or Defendant in the suit is a matter which need to be considered by the Court taking into consideration all aspects of the matter - direction in paragraph 56(i) be not treated as a general direction to the Courts to implead in all cases the husband of an aggrieved person and it is the Trial Court which is to exercise the jurisdiction Under Order I Rule 10. The direction in paragraph 56(i) are thus need to be read in the manner as indicated above. In the present case although husband of the Defendant was not a necessary party but in view of the pleadings in the written statement the husband was a proper party. What is the effect of orders passed Under Section 19 of the Act 2005 whether interim or final passed in the proceedings initiated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction? - HELD THAT - On conjoint reading of Sections 12(2) 17 19 20 22 23 25 26 and 28 of the D.V. Act it can safely be said that the proceedings under the D.V. Act and proceedings before a civil court family court or a criminal court as mentioned in Section 26 of the D.V. Act are independent proceedings like the proceedings Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for maintenance before the Magistrate and/or family court and the proceedings for maintenance before a civil court/family court for the reliefs under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. However as observed hereinabove the findings/orders passed by the one forum has to be considered by another forum - The order passed under D.V. Act whether interim or final shall be relevant and have to be given weight as one of evidence in the civil suit but the evidentiary value of such evidence is limited. The findings arrived therein by the magistrate are although not binding on the Civil Court but the order having passed under the Act 2005 which is an special Act has to be given its due weight. Thus following conclusions have been arrived (i) The pendency of proceedings under Act 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act Under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings which relate to the subject matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under D.V. Act 2005. (ii) The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim or final relief Under Section 19 of D.V. Act 2005 are relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be referred to and looked into by the civil court. (iii) A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence which has been led by the parties before the civil court. (iv) In the facts of the present case suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable and the issues raised by the Appellant as well as by the Defendant claiming a right Under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of evidence which is led by the parties in the suit. The High Court has rightly set aside the decree of the Trial Court and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication - appeal dismissed.
Issues Involved:
1. Definition of "shared household" under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 2. Correctness of the interpretation of Section 2(s) in the judgment of S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra. 3. Appropriateness of the Trial Court's decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Determination of the right to residence under Section 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 in civil proceedings. 5. Whether the Plaintiff can be considered a "Respondent" under Section 2(q) of the Act, 2005. 6. Meaning and extent of "save in accordance with the procedure established by law" under Section 17(2) of the Act, 2005. 7. Necessity of impleading the husband of the aggrieved party in the suit. 8. Effect of orders passed under Section 19 of the Act, 2005 on civil court proceedings. Detailed Analysis: 1. Definition of "Shared Household" under Section 2(s) of the Act, 2005: The Supreme Court analyzed the definition of "shared household" under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court concluded that the definition is exhaustive and includes a household where the aggrieved person lives or has lived in a domestic relationship, whether owned or tenanted by either party or jointly, and includes a household belonging to the joint family of which the Respondent is a member. The Court emphasized that "shared household" is not limited to properties owned or rented by the husband or joint family properties where the husband has a share. 2. Correctness of the Interpretation in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra: The Supreme Court held that the judgment in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra, which restricted the definition of "shared household" to properties owned or rented by the husband or joint family properties where the husband has a share, did not correctly interpret Section 2(s) of the Act, 2005. The Court clarified that the definition of "shared household" under Section 2(s) is broader and includes properties owned or rented by any relative of the husband with whom the aggrieved person has lived in a domestic relationship. 3. Appropriateness of the Trial Court's Decree under Order XII Rule 6: The Supreme Court observed that the Trial Court erred in passing a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure based on alleged admissions by the Defendant. The Court emphasized that judgment on admission should be based on clear, unambiguous, and unconditional admissions. The Defendant's claim that the suit property was a shared household and her right to residence under the Act, 2005, required a thorough examination and could not be summarily decided. 4. Determination of Right to Residence under Sections 17 and 19: The Supreme Court noted that Section 26 of the Act, 2005, allows for relief under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 to be sought in any legal proceeding before a civil court, family court, or criminal court. The Court held that the Defendant's claim of the suit property being a shared household and her right to residence should be examined in the civil suit. The Trial Court should have considered the Defendant's defense and determined her right to residence under the Act, 2005. 5. Whether the Plaintiff Can Be Considered a "Respondent": The Supreme Court held that the Plaintiff could be considered a "Respondent" under Section 2(q) of the Act, 2005, as the Defendant had sought relief against him in her application under Section 12. The Court emphasized that for the grant of any relief, the Defendant must prove that the Plaintiff had committed an act of domestic violence. 6. Meaning and Extent of "Save in Accordance with the Procedure Established by Law": The Supreme Court interpreted "save in accordance with the procedure established by law" under Section 17(2) to mean that the aggrieved person can be evicted or excluded from the shared household through legal proceedings in a competent court. The Court held that the suit for mandatory and permanent injunction filed by the Plaintiff was maintainable and should be decided based on the evidence presented. 7. Necessity of Impleading the Husband: The Supreme Court held that while the husband of the Defendant was not a necessary party, he was a proper party in the suit due to the Defendant's claim of right to residence under Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005. The Court modified the High Court's direction to implead the husband, stating that the Trial Court should exercise its discretion under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Effect of Orders Passed under Section 19 on Civil Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court held that the pendency of proceedings under the Act, 2005, or any interim or final order passed under Section 19, does not bar the initiation or continuation of civil proceedings. The Court emphasized that orders under the Act, 2005, are relevant and admissible in civil proceedings but are not conclusive. The civil court must determine the issues based on the evidence presented in the suit. Conclusion: The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to set aside the Trial Court's decree and remand the matter for fresh adjudication. The Court provided detailed guidelines on interpreting the definition of "shared household," the appropriateness of summary judgments, and the interplay between proceedings under the Act, 2005, and civil court proceedings.
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