2009 (6) TMI 72 - HC - Income Tax

Delay in filing of an appeal condonation of delay applicability of provisions of period of limitation act, 1963 held that - the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a special law. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. The scheme of the Income-tax Act, 1961, support the conclusion that time-limit prescribed under section 260A to file an appeal before the High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under section 5 of the Limitation Act and the limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to appeals filed under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Whether the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a complete code in itself.
3. Interpretation of the provisions of Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in relation to appeals to the High Court.
4. Comparison of provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1961, with those under the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to appeals filed under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The appellants argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act should apply to appeals under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act because there is no specific prohibition against it in the Act. They contended that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes Section 5 applicable unless expressly excluded. The respondents countered that the Income-tax Act is a complete code and the specific 120-day limitation period in Section 260A implicitly excludes Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court referred to the Full Bench judgment in CIT v. Velingkar Brothers, which held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under Section 260A. However, the court also considered the Supreme Court's judgment in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India (P.) Ltd., which held that the High Court cannot condone delays beyond the prescribed period under special laws like the Central Excise Act.

2. Whether the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a complete code in itself:
The respondents argued that the Income-tax Act is a complete code covering all aspects of income-tax, including appeals and revisions, and does not require the application of the Limitation Act. The court noted that the Income-tax Act provides specific provisions for condonation of delay for certain authorities but not for the High Court, indicating the Legislature's intent to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Rao Bahadur Ravulu Subba Rao v. CIT, affirming that the Income-tax Act is a self-contained code.

3. Interpretation of the provisions of Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in relation to appeals to the High Court:
Section 260A(1) allows appeals to the High Court on substantial questions of law. Section 260A(2) mandates that such appeals be filed within 120 days. The appellants argued that sub-section (7) of Section 260A, which applies provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to appeals under this section, implies that the High Court can condone delays as per Order 41, Rule 3A of the CPC. However, the court found that the specific time-limit in Section 260A(2) is absolute and unextendable, aligning with the Supreme Court's interpretation in Hongo India (P.) Ltd.

4. Comparison of provisions under the Income-tax Act, 1961, with those under the Central Excise Act, 1944:
The court compared the appeal provisions of the Income-tax Act with those of the Central Excise Act, noting that both Acts are special laws with similar structures for appeals and revisions. The court applied the doctrine of "pari materia," which allows reference to statutes dealing with the same subject for interpretation. The court concluded that the scheme of both Acts supports the conclusion that the time-limits prescribed for appeals are absolute and cannot be extended by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Conclusion:
The court held that the Income-tax Act, 1961, is a special law intended to be a complete code by itself. The time-limit prescribed under Section 260A for filing appeals to the High Court is absolute and cannot be extended by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, all the appeals filed beyond the prescribed 120-day period were dismissed on the ground of limitation.