2005 (7) TMI 83 - HC - Income Tax

This is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal by the Department by 137 days Respondent pointed that section 5 of the Limitation Act has no manner of application in an appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in view of the provisions contained in section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. According to him, the Income-tax Act is admittedly a special Act - A special period of limitation has been prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 260A. - We are unable to agree with the contention raised by the respondent, that section 5 has no manner of application in respect of an appeal preferred under section 260A - We find on the merits that the delay has been sufficiently explained. The delay, therefore, is condoned.

Summary

Issues:
- Application of Limitation Act in an appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act

Analysis:
The judgment involved an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in an appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act. The respondent contended that the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals under section 260A due to the special nature of the Income-tax Act. It was argued that since section 260A provides a specific period of limitation, the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act is excluded. The respondent relied on previous court decisions to support this argument. However, the appellant argued that there is no explicit exclusion of the Limitation Act in section 260A and that the special period of limitation provided does not necessarily imply exclusion of the Limitation Act.

The court examined the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Limitation Act to determine the applicability of the Limitation Act in appeals under section 260A. It was noted that while the Income-tax Act specifies a special period of limitation for appeals to the High Court, this does not automatically exclude the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. The court emphasized that for exclusion to occur, it must be expressly stated or necessarily implied by the statute itself. Since section 260A did not expressly exclude the application of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, the court held that the Limitation Act is applicable to appeals under section 260A.

Regarding the delay in the appeal, the court found that the delay had been adequately explained by the appellant, and therefore, the delay was condoned. The appeal was scheduled for admission after a week, and the memorandum of appeal was to be served to the respondent for both assessment years. Despite arguments on the merits of the delay explanation, no order was made regarding costs, and all parties were instructed to act on a signed copy of the order.

In conclusion, the judgment clarified that the Limitation Act is applicable to appeals under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, rejecting the argument that the special period of limitation provided in section 260A automatically excludes the application of the Limitation Act. The court also addressed the delay in the appeal, ultimately condoning the delay based on the explanation provided by the appellant.