1980 (3) TMI 52 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) has the power to set aside the assessment partially.
2. Interpretation of Section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
3. The scope of the AAC's powers to issue directions to the Income-tax Officer (ITO).
4. The validity of partial relief granted by the AAC and the concept of remand under the Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) has the power to set aside the assessment partially:

The primary question referred to the court was whether the AAC has the authority to set aside an assessment partially. The court observed that the AAC granted relief to the assessee by setting aside the assessment partially and directing the ITO to re-examine the issue afresh, excluding three items. The revenue contended that the AAC's order was ultra vires, arguing that Section 251(1)(a) of the Act does not contemplate a partial setting aside of the assessment. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that the AAC's powers include the ability to reduce and enhance assessments, which inherently involves partial interference with the assessment order.

2. Interpretation of Section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

The court delved into the interpretation of Section 251(1)(a), which confers appellate powers on the AAC. The revenue argued that the AAC could only confirm, reduce, enhance, or annul the assessment, or set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the ITO for a fresh assessment. The court, however, noted that Section 251 is a procedural provision that should be liberally construed. The court emphasized that the power to reduce or enhance the assessment involves the authority to interfere partially with the assessment order. The court further highlighted that the section allows the AAC to set aside the assessment and issue directions to the ITO, approximating the powers of a remanding authority.

3. The scope of the AAC's powers to issue directions to the Income-tax Officer (ITO):

The court examined whether the AAC's directions to the ITO were binding and whether the ITO could disregard these directions. The court referred to the case of Pulipati Subbarao and Co. v. AAC, where it was held that the ITO was bound by the AAC's specific directions. The court disagreed with the Madras High Court's decision in CIT v. Seth Manicklal Fomra, which suggested that the ITO could disregard the AAC's directions. The court affirmed that once the AAC issues directions under Section 251(1)(a), the ITO must comply with them.

4. The validity of partial relief granted by the AAC and the concept of remand under the Act:

The court addressed the revenue's argument that the AAC's partial relief amounted to an unauthorized order of remand. The court clarified that the absence of the word "remand" in Section 251(1)(a) does not affect the AAC's authority to issue directions for a fresh assessment. The court emphasized that the AAC's power to set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the ITO includes the ability to uphold certain items of income while excluding others. The court highlighted that a restrictive interpretation of the AAC's powers would lead to unnecessary litigation and delay.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that the AAC has the authority to set aside the assessment partially and issue directions to the ITO for a fresh assessment. The court answered the question in favor of the assessee and against the revenue, affirming that the AAC's powers under Section 251(1)(a) include the ability to grant partial relief and issue binding directions to the ITO. The assessee was awarded costs, with an advocate's fee of Rs. 250.