2018 (9) TMI 172 - HC - Central Excise

Condonation of delay in filing appeal - power of Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay beyond statutory period - proviso to sub section (1) of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - Held that - Though reasons assigned, may appear to be sufficient, statute does not provide condonation beyond the period provided therefor. If the prayer is accepted, then it would be amounting to adding words to the enactment - there is no error in rejecting the appeals filed beyond the statutory period therefor. Substantial questions of law raised are answered against the appellant - appeal dismissed for having filed beyond condonable period.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Violation of principles of natural justice.
2. Dismissal of appeal due to delay and the power to condone delay.
3. Interpretation of Section 35 (1) and its mandatory time limit.
4. Distinction between Sections 35 (1), 35 B (3), and 35 B (3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
5. Tribunal's failure to decide the appeal on merits.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice:
The appellant contended that the Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s ex-parte order, violating natural justice principles. The court did not specifically address this issue in detail, focusing instead on statutory interpretations and limitations.

2. Dismissal of Appeal Due to Delay and the Power to Condon Delay:
The appellant argued that the Commissioner (Appeals) has the discretionary power to condone delays beyond thirty days if sufficient cause is shown. The court, however, clarified that under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, an appeal must be filed within sixty days, with a possible extension of thirty days if sufficient cause is demonstrated. Beyond this ninety-day period, the Commissioner (Appeals) has no authority to condone the delay.

3. Interpretation of Section 35 (1) and Its Mandatory Time Limit:
The appellant's counsel argued that Section 35 (1) does not prescribe a mandatory time limit for filing appeals, unlike Section 35B, which does. The court disagreed, stating that Section 35 explicitly allows a sixty-day period for filing appeals, extendable by thirty days for sufficient cause, thus making the ninety-day limit mandatory.

4. Distinction Between Sections 35 (1), 35 B (3), and 35 B (3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944:
The appellant highlighted differences in the language used in Sections 35 (1) and 35B, suggesting that the legislature intended different time limits for different appellate forums. The court maintained that Section 35's time limit is clear and mandatory, and the Commissioner (Appeals) cannot condone delays beyond the specified period. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Singh Enterprises, which upheld the statutory limits for filing appeals and the restricted power of the Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delays.

5. Tribunal's Failure to Decide the Appeal on Merits:
The appellant argued that the Tribunal should have decided the appeal on merits, as the issues were in favor of the appellant. The court held that statutory provisions must be adhered to, and the Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeal due to the delay, without addressing the merits.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals, affirming that the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal acted within their statutory limits by not condoning delays beyond the prescribed period. The substantial questions of law were answered against the appellant, reinforcing the mandatory nature of the time limits set by Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944.