1989 (2) TMI 112 - SC - Central Excise

Whether a learned single judge sitting in chambers is competent to dismiss applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals under Order XX-A of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, regarding appeals under section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, as well as under Order XX-B regarding appeals under section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962, and section 35L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944? Held that - A single learned judge, in chambers, is and was always competent to dismiss all applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals. We find nothing repugnant in the same and no substance in the contention that otherwise the same would be violative of article 14 of the Constitution. The review petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed.

Issues Involved:
1. Competence of a single judge to dismiss applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals.
2. Interpretation of relevant rules under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
3. Applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution in the context of different treatments for applications under statutory appeals and special leave petitions.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Competence of a Single Judge to Dismiss Applications for Condonation of Delay in Statutory Appeals:
The primary issue was whether a single judge sitting in chambers could dismiss applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals under various acts, including the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, the Customs Act, 1962, and the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It was argued that such applications should be heard by a Bench of at least two judges. The court, however, held that a single judge was competent to dismiss such applications. This competence is derived from Order VI, Rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, which allows a single judge to handle applications for enlargement or abridgement of time, excluding those for special leave petitions.

2. Interpretation of Relevant Rules under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966:
The court examined the relevant rules under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. Order XX-B relates to appeals under the Customs Act and the Central Excises and Salt Act, while Order XX-A pertains to appeals under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act. Rule 3 of Order XX-A mandates that all statutory appeals must be placed before the court for ex parte admission. The court clarified that Rule 2(14) of Order VI, which includes applications for enlargement or abridgement of time, encompasses applications for condonation of delay. The court referenced the decision in CIT v. R. H. Pandit, AIR 1974 SC 2269, which established that applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal fall within the chamber business under Order VI, Rule 2(14).

3. Applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution:
The Additional Solicitor-General argued that different treatments for applications under statutory appeals and special leave petitions violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The court rejected this argument, stating that applications under Article 136 are a special class and can be legitimately treated separately from other applications. The court emphasized that arranging the business of the court is within its domain and that the practice of a single judge handling applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals is just, fair, and reasonable. The court also referenced the decision in P. N. Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, which upheld the circulation system for the disposal of review petitions, indicating that different treatments for different types of applications do not violate fundamental rights.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the practice of a single judge in chambers dismissing applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals. The court found no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and saw no reason to alter the established practice. The review petitions were dismissed, affirming the competence of a single judge to handle such matters.

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