1972 (3) TMI 29 - SC - Customs

Whether the shipment and export of iron ore by the appellant became liable to the said duty introduced on 2 August, 1966? Held that - Section 16 of the 1962 Act speaks of the fictional date only in relation to the order the date of entry outwards of the vessel. In the present case, the order of entry outwards of the vessel was made prior to 2 August, 1966. Therefore, the Customs Authorities in the impugned order acted without jurisdiction in imposing duty on the export by holding that the date of entry outwards of the vessel was the date when the vessel arrived . For the foregoing reasons the appellant is entitled to an order cancelling the notice dated 28 January, 1967 by which the Customs Authorities demanded duty from the appellant. The order of the Judicial Commissioner is set aside. There will be a writ setting aside the notice dated 28 January, 1967 and an order forbearing the respondents from taking any steps or proceedings pursuant to the notice dated 28 January, 1967. There will also be an order quashing the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs dated 19 April, 1967 which gave effect to the notice and held the appellant liable to pay the export duty.

Summary

Issues:
- Challenge of export duty levy on iron ore shipment
- Interpretation of relevant provisions of Customs Act, 1962
- Determination of the date for levy of export duty
- Application of Section 16 and Section 39 of the Customs Act, 1962
- Jurisdiction of Customs authorities in imposing export duty

Analysis:

The appellant challenged the imposition of export duty amounting to Rs. 98044 on the shipment of iron ore. The dispute revolved around the date on which the duty became payable, specifically whether it was applicable to the appellant's export. The key contention was the interpretation of Section 16 of the Customs Act, 1962, which determines the rate of duty for export goods. The appellant argued that since the shipping bill was presented before the vessel's entry outwards, the duty should not apply. Conversely, the Customs authorities maintained that the duty was leviable based on the vessel's arrival and loading date.

The relevant provisions of the Customs Act, including Sections 16, 39, 50, and 51, were crucial in determining the timeline for duty imposition. Section 16 stipulates that the rate of duty for export goods is based on the date of shipping bill presentation or payment of duty, with a provision for deeming the bill's presentation date as the vessel's entry outwards date. Section 39 outlines the requirement for granting entry outwards to a vessel before loading export goods, which was fulfilled in this case before the vessel's arrival.

The court analyzed the historical context by comparing Section 38 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, with Section 16 of the current Act. It highlighted the distinction in provisions related to the determination of duty rates concerning the vessel's arrival date. The judgment emphasized that under the current Act, the fictional date for duty determination is linked to the vessel's entry outwards date, not its arrival date, as was the case under the previous legislation.

Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the appellant, setting aside the Customs authorities' duty demand and the Judicial Commissioner's decision. It quashed the duty imposition order and prohibited further action based on the notice issued. The judgment clarified the jurisdictional error in imposing duty based on the vessel's arrival date rather than the entry outwards date, as prescribed by the Customs Act, 1962.

In conclusion, the appellant succeeded in challenging the levy of export duty through a meticulous analysis of statutory provisions and historical legislative intent. The judgment underscored the importance of adhering to the prescribed timeline for duty determination under the Customs Act, safeguarding against arbitrary duty imposition based on incorrect dates.