Home
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
1976 (3) TMI 53 - SC - CustomsWhether Section 108 of the Customs Act 1962 is ultra vires the provisions of Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution? Whether this statement was hit by Section 24 of the Evidence Act? Held that - The Customs authorities called the appellant and his companion to the Customs House took them into custody and after due compliance with the requirements of law the Inspector of Customs questioned the appellant and recorded his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act. Under the circumstances it was manifest that at the time when the Customs Officer recorded the statement of the appellant the latter was not formally accused of any offence . The High Court was therefore right in holding that the statement recorded by the Inspector of Customs was not hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The mere fact that the Inspector of Customs had before recording the statement warned the deponent of the possibility of his prosecution for perjury in case he did not make the statement truthfully cannot be construed as a threat held out by the officer which could have reasonably caused the person making the statement to suppose that he would by making that statement gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him for smuggling. No hesitation in holding that the statement Ex. 1 was not barred under Section 24 Evidence Act. The statement Ex. P-1 was clearly admissible under Section 21 Evidence Act as an admission of incriminating facts. The circumstances of the arrest of the appellant while escaping from the truck the seizure of the truck and the goods the contraband nature of the goods the fact that at the time of the seizure the goods were in the charge of the appellant the fact that no duty on these goods had been paid the seizure of 2, 000/- as cash from the appellant etc. were proved by evidence aliunde rendered by P.Ws. 1 and 2. To some extent the hostile witness P.W. 5 also supported the prosecution. The circumstances established unmistakably and irresistibly pointed to the conclusion that the appellant was knowingly concerned in a fraudulent attempt at evasion if not fraudulent evasion of duty chargeable on those contraband goods. Appeal dismissed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 is ultra vires the provisions of Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution. 2. Whether the appellant's statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 was hit by Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution. 3. Whether the appellant's statement was hit by Section 24 of the Evidence Act. 4. Whether the incriminating facts admitted in the appellant's statement, along with other evidence, were sufficient to establish an offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Ultra Vires of Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962: The main question for consideration was whether Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 is ultra vires the provisions of Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution. However, this issue was not pressed by the appellant's counsel before the Supreme Court. 2. Applicability of Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution: The appellant contended that his statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act was hit by Clause (3) of Article 20 because he was "accused of an offence" under Section 124 of the Bombay Police Act at the time of making the statement, and it was obtained under compulsion. The Court analyzed Clause (3) of Article 20, which provides that "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." It was noted that to claim the benefit of this clause, it must be shown that the person was "accused of any offence" and made the statement under compulsion. The Court referred to previous decisions, including R.C. Mehta v. State of West Bengal, which clarified that a person is considered "accused of an offence" only when a formal accusation has been levelled. The Court concluded that when the appellant's statement was recorded by the Customs Officer, he was not formally "accused of any offence" under the Customs Act. The formal accusation occurred only when the complaint was filed by the Assistant Collector of Customs. Therefore, the statement was not hit by Clause (3) of Article 20. 3. Applicability of Section 24 of the Evidence Act: The appellant argued that his statement was obtained under compulsion of law and was hit by Section 24 of the Evidence Act. To attract the prohibition under Section 24, it must be shown that the statement is a confession, made by an accused person to a person in authority, and obtained by inducement, threat, or promise. The Court found that the statement was not a "confession" as it contained exculpatory matter and did not admit all the facts constituting the offence. Additionally, there was no evidence that the Customs Officer had offered any inducement or held out any threat or promise to the appellant. The Court also noted that the compulsion to state the truth under Section 108 of the Customs Act emanates from law, not from a person in authority. Therefore, the statement was not barred under Section 24 and was admissible as an admission of incriminating facts. 4. Sufficiency of Evidence to Establish Offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act: The appellant contended that the incriminating facts admitted in his statement, along with other evidence, were insufficient to establish an offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act. The Court acknowledged that the statutory presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act could not be invoked due to the absence of the requisite notification. However, the Court found that the circumstances established unerringly raised an inference regarding all the factual ingredients of an offence under Section 135(b) read with Section 135(ii) of the Customs Act. The appellant's statement, corroborated by other evidence, indicated that the packages containing contraband goods were surreptitiously loaded in the truck, and the appellant was knowingly concerned in a fraudulent attempt at evasion of duty. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to establish the offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld, maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Section 135(a) of the Customs Act with a reduced sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment.
|