Issues: Scope of proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944.
Detailed Analysis: The appeal filed by a statutory body under the Factories Act raised a question regarding the scope of the proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944. The appellant had two units - a concrete unit and a wood unit. The concrete unit's finished products were sold to outsiders and had a license under the Act. However, the wood unit's products were used internally, and the appellant believed no license was required for it. The Central Excise Department issued a notice under Rule 173 in 1984, alleging duty evasion. The Tribunal found that while the concrete unit was compliant, the wood unit required a license as it was engaged in manufacturing. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's claim of honest belief, stating there was no proof of acting diligently. The Tribunal inferred an intention to evade duty due to the lack of evidence that the wood unit was exempt from duty.
Section 11A of the Act empowers Central Excise Officers to initiate proceedings within six months, extendable to five years for fraud or suppression of facts. The proviso to Section 11A requires both specific situations (fraud, collusion, etc.) and intent to evade duty for its application. The burden of proof lies with the Department to establish the existence of situations under the proviso. Once proven, the burden shifts to the appellant to show no deliberate evasion of duty. The term "evade" implies a deliberate avoidance of paying duty known to be leviable. The case law clarifies that doubt regarding duty liability precludes invoking the proviso. In this case, the appellant, a non-profit body, had a license for the concrete unit but not the wood unit based on advice from the Excise Department. The Tribunal's finding of an intention to evade duty lacked a factual basis, as no deliberate act was proven.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's order and quashing the duty and penalty notice. The Court found no basis for inferring an intention to evade duty by the appellant, given the lack of concrete evidence supporting such a conclusion.