2023 (9) TMI 171 - SCH - Indian Laws

Interpretation of statute - disposal of an application under Section 33 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would be the starting point for limitation or not - HELD THAT - Once the arbitral award has been amended or corrected, it is the corrected award which has to be challenged and not the original award. The original award stands modified, and the corrected award must be challenged by filing objections. In the present case, the objections/application for setting aside the arbitral award were filed on 03.08.2018, which is within a period of ninety days from the date of the corrected award. Hence, the High Court was right in holding that the objections were filed within the limitation period. Even otherwise, the Court has the power to condone the delay for further period of thirty days. Application for condonation of delay can be filed at anytime till the proceedings are pending. Of course, exercise of discretion and whether or not the delay should be condoned is a different matter. There are no good ground and reason to interfere with the impugned judgment - SLP dismissed.

Summary

Issues: Interpretation of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 regarding limitation period for challenging arbitral awards.

In the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court, the court interpreted Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in the context of an application moved by a party before the arbitral tribunal under Section 33 of the Act. The court held that the disposal of an application under Section 33 would mark the starting point for the limitation period. The arbitral tribunal, utilizing its powers under sub-section (3) of Section 33, made corrections to the award within 30 days from the date of the arbitral award. The court emphasized that the corrected award must be challenged, not the original award, as the original award stands modified by the corrections made. The purpose behind Section 34(3) is to allow parties time to study, examine, and understand the award before filing objections within the specified time.

Furthermore, the court highlighted that the date of correction and receipt of the corrected award by the party would be the starting point for the limitation period in case of suo-moto corrections. The judgment referenced a previous case, "M/S Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons Vs. Union of India," to support this interpretation. In the present case, objections to set aside the arbitral award were filed within ninety days from the date of the corrected award, thus falling within the limitation period. The High Court's decision to uphold the objections as timely filed was deemed correct. The court also mentioned the possibility of condoning the delay for an additional thirty days, emphasizing that the discretion to condone delays lies with the court and can be exercised until the proceedings are pending.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no valid reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and dismissed the special leave petition, affirming the High Court's decision regarding the limitation period for challenging arbitral awards and the filing of objections within the prescribed timeline.