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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the concession agreement is a works contract under the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983. 2. Applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 over the 1983 Act for dispute resolution. 3. Validity of the Trial Court's order terminating the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the concession agreement is a works contract under the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983: The primary issue was to determine if the concession agreement constituted a works contract as defined under Section 2(i) of the 1983 Act. The court analyzed the nature of the agreement, emphasizing the distinction between a concession agreement and a works contract. It was observed that a works contract typically involves a lump sum payment for execution of work, whereas a concession agreement involves detailed design, financing, and operation, with the concessionaire recovering costs through toll collection. The court highlighted several features such as the creation of an Escrow Account, State Support Agreement, and the absence of tax liabilities like VAT, which differentiated a concession agreement from a works contract. The court concluded that the agreement in question was indeed a concession agreement and not a works contract, thus not falling under the purview of the 1983 Act. 2. Applicability of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 over the 1983 Act for dispute resolution: The court examined whether the dispute should be resolved under the 1996 Act or the 1983 Act. It was noted that the concession agreement and the State Support Agreement both contained clauses specifying resolution under the 1996 Act. The court referred to several Supreme Court decisions, including V.A. Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. and A.P.S. Kushwaha, which supported the application of the 1996 Act where an arbitration clause existed. The court also considered the respondent's admission in the statement of defense that the agreement was a concession agreement, thus binding them to resolve disputes under the 1996 Act. The court determined that the 1996 Act was applicable, given the arbitration clause and the nature of the agreement. 3. Validity of the Trial Court's order terminating the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal: The Trial Court's order, which held that the proceedings under the 1996 Act were invalid and that disputes should be adjudicated under the 1983 Act, was scrutinized. The High Court found that the Trial Court's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the agreement as a works contract. The High Court emphasized that both parties had initially agreed to arbitration under the 1996 Act, and the Trial Court's order contradicted this understanding. The High Court concluded that the Trial Court's order suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record and could not be sustained legally. Consequently, the High Court quashed the Trial Court's order and allowed the writ petition, affirming that the dispute should be resolved under the 1996 Act.
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