1994 (4) TMI 86 - HC - Customs

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of whether Sodium Vapour Lamps qualify as spares under the Import Policy.
2. Determination of whether Sodium Vapour Lamps can be considered consumer goods under the Import Policy.

Analysis:

Issue 1: Interpretation of whether Sodium Vapour Lamps qualify as spares under the Import Policy:
The petitioners contended that Sodium Vapour Lamps should be considered spares under the Import Policy, even though they are complete items in themselves. The Import Policy defined spares as parts ready for substitution. The court disagreed with the petitioners, stating that the term "spares" must be understood in common parlance and cannot include complete items. The court upheld the adjudicating authority's decision that Sodium Vapour Lamps do not qualify as spares, as claimed by the petitioners. The court emphasized that a whole item cannot be considered a part, and therefore, the petitioners were not entitled to import the lamps under the additional license.

Issue 2: Determination of whether Sodium Vapour Lamps can be considered consumer goods under the Import Policy:
The petitioners argued that Sodium Vapour Lamps do not satisfy human needs directly and therefore should not be classified as consumer goods under the Import Policy. However, the court disagreed with this argument, stating that consumer goods include items that satisfy human needs without further processing, such as consumer durables. The court held that Sodium Vapour Lamps, even if not used in residential premises, still qualify as consumer goods as they are used by entities like municipal corporations, airport authorities, and stadium authorities. The court upheld the adjudicating authority's decision that the import of Sodium Vapour Lamps falls within the definition of consumer goods, leading to the imposition of fines in lieu of confiscation.

In conclusion, the court discharged the rule with costs, directing the petitioners to pay the fines and penalties imposed by the adjudicating authority. The court found no infirmity in the orders of February 4, 1986, and February 13, 1986, and rejected the petitioners' challenge to the correctness of the order.