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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the term "re-made" in the context of Central Excise Rule 173L. 2. Whether the process of converting broken sheet glass into new sheet glass constitutes "manufacture" or "re-making". 3. Eligibility for refund under Rule 173L based on the nature of the process. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation of the Term "Re-made" in the Context of Central Excise Rule 173L: The core issue in these appeals revolves around the interpretation of the word "re-made" as used in Rule 173L of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The appellants argued that the term "re-made" should include the process of converting broken sheet glass back into new sheet glass without using any additional raw materials like sand or silica. They contended that this process should not be classified as "manufacture" but as "re-making", citing various precedents and definitions to support their claim. The respondents, however, maintained that the process of melting broken glass pieces to produce new sheet glass is essentially the same as the initial manufacturing process and should be classified as "manufacture". They argued that the classification of the goods changes from broken glass pieces to sheet glass under different tariff headings, which supports their stance that the process is manufacturing. 2. Whether the Process Constitutes "Manufacture" or "Re-making": The Tribunal examined various definitions and legal interpretations of the terms "manufacture" and "re-made". The appellants cited several cases, including McNicol v. Pinch, Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, and others, to argue that "re-made" should be understood in a broader sense that encompasses their process. The Tribunal noted that Rule 173L allows for a refund of duty on goods returned to the factory for being "re-made, refined, reconditioned or subjected to any other similar process". The Tribunal reasoned that if the goods were required to be returned in the same condition, the terms "re-made" and "reconditioned" would be redundant. Therefore, the correct interpretation should be that the goods returned for re-making do not need to be in the same condition as when they were originally cleared. 3. Eligibility for Refund Under Rule 173L: The Assistant Collector had rejected the refund claims on the grounds that the returned goods were not the same as those originally cleared and that the process involved was re-manufacture, not re-making. The Collector (Appeals) upheld this decision, adding that verification of the goods was not possible. The Tribunal found that the Assistant Collector did not raise the issue of verification in the original order, implying that the department did not dispute the fact that the original consignments were returned. Therefore, the Collector (Appeals) should not have rejected the appeals on this ground. The Tribunal concluded that the process of converting broken sheet glass into new sheet glass falls under the term "re-made" as used in Rule 173L. The Tribunal cited the case of Sriram Pistons and Rings Ltd., which dealt with a similar issue under Rule 173H, to support their interpretation that "re-making" does not necessarily exclude processes that could be considered as manufacturing. Separate Judgments: 1. Majority Opinion: The majority of the Tribunal members held that the term "re-made" in Rule 173L includes the process of converting broken sheet glass into new sheet glass. They found that the process qualifies for a refund under Rule 173L as it constitutes re-making, not manufacturing. The appeals were allowed with consequential relief to the appellants. 2. Dissenting Opinion: One member disagreed, arguing that the process of converting broken glass into new sheet glass is manufacturing and not merely re-making. He emphasized that Rule 173L deliberately omits the term "remanufacture" and that the process should be classified as manufacturing, thereby disqualifying the appellants from a refund under Rule 173L. Final Order: In view of the majority opinion, all four appeals were allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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