9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the order made by the Assessing Officer under section 143(3) was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. 2. Whether the assessee is entitled to 100% deduction of its income under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) of the Income-tax Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Erroneous and Prejudicial Order by Assessing Officer: The assessee appealed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) dated 27-11-1996 under section 263, arguing that the Assessing Officer's (AO) order under section 143(3) was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The AO had allowed the assessee's claim for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii), which exempts profits and gains of a cooperative society engaged in the marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members. The AO verified that the agricultural produce was indeed produced by the farmers who were members of the assessee-society. The AO referred to various judicial decisions, including CIT v. Karjan Co-operative Cotton Sale Ginning & Pressing Society Ltd [1981] 129 ITR 821 (Guj.), which held that marketing includes all activities connected with the process of making agricultural produce marketable. The AO concluded that the society was eligible for exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) even after the manufacturing of sugar from sugarcane, as it continued to be an agricultural produce. 2. Entitlement to 100% Deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(iii): The CIT found the AO's order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, observing that the AO wrongly held that the income earned by the society was exempt under section 80P(2)(a)(iii). The CIT argued that sugar produced from sugarcane does not remain an agricultural produce, and the AO had misapplied the ratio of the decision in Broach District Co-operative Cotton Sales, Ginning & Pressing Society Ltd.'s case. The CIT noted that the assessee was engaged in elaborate industrial activities, including crushing and processing sugarcane into sugar and other by-products, which are distinct commercial activities. The CIT directed that the assessment order be made de novo, allowing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee's counsel contended that the income from the sale of sugar was exempt under section 80P(2)(a)(iii), citing various judicial decisions supporting the claim that marketing includes all activities from production to the ultimate consumer. The counsel also argued that the term 'marketing' should be interpreted liberally to include the processing of agricultural produce to make it marketable. The Departmental Representative (DR) argued that the real issue was whether marketing of agricultural produce includes the manufacture of sugar from sugarcane, and whether sugar remains an agricultural produce after conversion. The DR cited judicial decisions emphasizing strict interpretation of exemption provisions, arguing that processing cannot include manufacturing. After considering the submissions and judicial precedents, the Tribunal concluded that the marketing of agricultural produce under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) must relate to the produce as grown by the members. The Tribunal held that after the manufacture of sugar, it ceases to retain the character of agricultural produce grown by the members. The Tribunal upheld the CIT's order, concluding that the AO's assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the CIT under section 263 was upheld, confirming that the assessee was not entitled to the claimed deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) for the income derived from the manufacture and sale of sugar.
|
