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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the recorded information regarding the commission of an offence and the order granting rewards to informants are privileged under Sections 124 and 125 of the Evidence Act. 2. Whether the trial court's notice directing the production of these documents should be quashed. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Privilege under Sections 124 and 125 of the Evidence Act The primary issue revolves around whether the recorded information about the commission of an offence and the order granting rewards to informants are protected under Sections 124 and 125 of the Evidence Act. Section 124 states, "No public officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the disclosure." The court recognized that Customs Officials are Officers of the Revenue, as established in the Supreme Court decision in Ramesh Chandra v. State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 940). The court further elaborated that Section 124 includes communications made in official confidence by private individuals to public officers, citing In Re Subramanian Chettiar (1967 CrI. LJ. 1232) and Public Prosecutors v. P.S. Ismail (1973 CrI. LJ. 931). The court emphasized that such communications are made to enable public officers to take necessary actions to protect public interests. The petitioner argued for a class immunity for recorded information about crimes, similar to the immunity recognized under Section 123 of the Evidence Act for certain high-level government documents, as discussed in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149). However, the court rejected this argument, stating that class immunity under Section 124 should not be granted irrespective of the document's content, especially in a criminal trial where the accused's liberty is at stake. The court concluded that recorded information about the commission of an offence cannot constitute a class to which immunity should be extended irrespective of the contents. The trial court should decide on the claim of privilege based on the specific document's content and the context of the trial. Issue 2: Quashing the Trial Court's Notice The petitioner sought to quash the trial court's notice directing the production of the recorded information and the order granting rewards. The court noted that the petitioner had not claimed privilege under Section 124 before the trial court. The proper procedure would be for the official to apply to the trial court, which would then decide on the claim of privilege. Regarding the order granting rewards, the court highlighted Section 125 of the Evidence Act, which states, "No Magistrate or Police Officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of any offence, and no Revenue Officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of any offence against the public revenue." The court interpreted this to mean that the trial court cannot compel the disclosure of the informant's identity, which would be revealed by the order granting rewards. The court referenced State of Andhra Pradesh v. P.S. Ismail (1973 CrI. LJ. 931), where similar information was held to be privileged under Section 124. Additionally, the court noted that the relevance of the reward to the trial was questionable, citing Asian Narain v. State of Maharashtra (1973 Cri. L.J. 1839), where the Supreme Court held that the nothings about the informant claiming reward were irrelevant to the trial. Conclusion: The court quashed the trial court's notice insofar as it related to requiring the petitioner to produce the order granting rewards to the informant, as this was privileged under Section 125 of the Evidence Act. However, the notice was sustained in other respects. The petitioner was allowed to claim privilege regarding the recorded information about the commission of the offence, with the trial court to dispose of the matter according to law.
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