2010 (3) TMI 61 - HC - Income Tax

Delay in filing an appeal before High Court - Whether the delay in filing of the appeal beyond the period of 120 days prescribed by Section 260-A(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could be condoned by entertaining an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 held that - that wherever the legislature desires to provide for condonation of delay, a specific provision has been made in the Act and, therefore, if no such provision has been made, then no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be filed as the Act itself is a complete code like Excise Act, which has been considered by their Lordships of Hon ble the Supreme Court in Hongo India Private Limited. The reasoning adopted by Hon ble the Supreme Court in the case of Hongo India Private Limited is fully applicable to the question raised in the present appeals. Therefore, we are of the view that the applications seeking condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be accepted

Summary

Issues Involved:
Delay in filing appeals under Section 260-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis:
The judgment by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dealt with several appeals challenging orders by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh. The main issue before the Court was whether the delay in filing the appeal beyond the prescribed period of 120 days under Section 260-A(2)(a) of the Income-tax Act could be condoned by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court referred to a Supreme Court decision in the case of Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., which held that where a special law provides for limitation, the provisions of the Limitation Act may not apply. The Court highlighted that specific provisions in the Income-tax Act regarding condonation of delay indicate that if no such provision exists, applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained. The judgment emphasized that the Income-tax Act, like the Excise Act, is a complete code governing limitation matters within its scope.

The Court analyzed various sections of the Income-tax Act, such as Section 143(1), Section 249(3), and Section 260A(2)(a), to support its conclusion that the Act provides for specific provisions regarding condonation of delay. It was noted that the legislature's intent was clear in providing time limits for filing appeals and references, and that the Act itself serves as a comprehensive framework for dealing with such matters. The judgment highlighted that in the absence of a specific provision allowing for condonation of delay, applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be accepted. Consequently, the Court dismissed the applications seeking condonation of delay, leading to the dismissal of the appeals as being time-barred.

In conclusion, the High Court's judgment underscored the importance of adhering to the prescribed timelines for filing appeals under the Income-tax Act and reiterated that the Act's provisions regarding limitation should be strictly followed without recourse to general provisions under the Limitation Act. The decision provided clarity on the scope of condonation of delay in filing appeals under the Income-tax Act, emphasizing the Act's self-sufficiency in addressing such procedural aspects.