2024 (10) TMI 1331 - HC - VAT / Sales Tax

Quashing of disciplinary proceedings midway, i.e., at the stage when the enquiry had been completed - jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority - HELD THAT - There was no adversarial order, resulting in no cause of action to canvass or maintain the Writ Petition. The mere pendency of the inquiry or the Writ Petitioner s apprehension of any adverse orders cannot be a ground to maintain the Writ Petition. It is apparent that no rights of the Writ Petitioner have been abridged, nor has the inquiry resulted in altering the service conditions. In that context, the mere issuance of the show cause notice would not confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain and appreciate the Writ Petition. In the absence of any right of the litigant being adversely affected, it is not seen how the learned Single Judge could have heard and ordered the Writ Petition. Appreciation of the facts is the domain of the statutory authorities, specifically the disciplinary authority in this case - the Appellant/Department is directed to produce the records relating to the refund claim, which has been the contention between the Appellant/Department and the Employee. The learned Single Judge has erred in taking up the role of the disciplinary authority and in attempting to substitute the opinion of the disciplinary authority with the opinion of this Court, which is impermissible. The learned Single Judge could not have usurped or pre-empted the statutorily empowered disciplinary authority from forming an opinion on imposing or not imposing any penalties. The authority to impose or not impose any penalty, as provided under the rules, is in the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority, an action that has now been pre-empted by the impugned order. The Writ Petition itself was premature in the absence of any adverse impact on the rights or service conditions of the Writ Petitioner. There are no hesitation in allowing the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The impugned order is set aside, and the matter is remitted back to the disciplinary/competent authority for consideration of the reply to be submitted by the Respondent/Writ Petitioner. Thereafter, the disciplinary/competent authority shall pass necessary orders within six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of the reply to the second show cause notice - appeal allowed by way of remand.

Summary

Issues:
Challenging the quashing of disciplinary proceedings midway by the learned Single Judge.

Analysis:
The High Court heard the appeal challenging the order of the Single Judge, who had quashed the disciplinary proceedings midway after the completion of the enquiry and the issuance of the second show cause notice. The Court found that the Single Judge had overstepped by usurping the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority, which is impermissible. The disciplinary authority has the exclusive power to decide on imposing or not imposing punishment after evaluating the matter on merits. The Court emphasized that the Single Judge's interference preempted this process, which was not justified.

The Court noted that there was no adversarial order affecting the rights of the Writ Petitioner, making it improper to maintain the Writ Petition. The mere pendency of the inquiry or the apprehension of adverse orders does not provide a basis for the Writ Petition. The Court highlighted that without any adverse impact on the rights or service conditions of the Writ Petitioner, the Single Judge should not have entertained the Writ Petition. The jurisdiction to appreciate the facts lies with the statutory authorities, particularly the disciplinary authority, rather than the Court.

Regarding the defense raised by the Respondent/Writ Petitioner, the Court opined that these grounds could have been better assessed by the disciplinary authority rather than the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court criticized the Single Judge for attempting to substitute the opinion of the disciplinary authority with its own, emphasizing that the authority to impose or not impose penalties rests solely with the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the impugned order and remitting the matter back to the disciplinary/competent authority for further consideration.

In conclusion, the Court directed the Respondent/Writ Petitioner to submit a reply to the second show cause notice within three weeks. If no reply is submitted, the disciplinary/competent authority is authorized to take appropriate action based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Court emphasized that the Writ Petition was premature, and there shall be no order as to costs.