2025 (4) TMI 969 - AT - IBC

Time limitation for admission of Section 7 application filed by the Unity Small Finance Bank Ltd.- Respondent No.1 - whether the date of default arising out of the arbitral award could have been taken cognisance of by the Adjudicating Authority in extending the period of limitation without a formal amendment application seeking alteration of the date of default? - HELD THAT - The date of default by the Corporate Debtor as claimed by the Respondent No.1 is 12.11.2018. It is also noticed that the Part-IV makes a mention of the arbitral award of 28.04.2022 at paras (g) and (h). However it is also pertinent to note that the Part-IV does not claim the date of arbitral award to be the new date of default. It is also noticed that mention has been made that execution proceeding in respect of the arbitral award is currently pending adjudication before the Hon ble Bombay High Court. Perusal of the impugned order shows that the date of default in terms of the above order was 12.11.2018 and the date of NPA was 12.02.2019. The impugned order has also taken note that arbitration proceedings had been initiated against the Corporate Debtor in which arbitral award was passed in favour of the Respondent No.1-Financial Creditor on 28.04.2022. While holding the date of default to be 12.11.2018 the Adjudicating Authority has however worked out the period of limitation by taking into account the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the Suo Moto matter and the arbitral award to find the Section 7 application to be within limitation. It is therefore clear that the Adjudicating Authority has on its own held that the arbitral award gave rise to a fresh cause of action and a fresh period of limitation even while the date of default remained unchanged from what was declared as 12.11.2018 in Part-IV of the Section 7 application by the Respondent No.1. The Appellant Respondent No.1 and the Adjudicating Authority have all acknowledged the settled law laid down in the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy Anr. 2021 (8) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT wherein it held that a final judgment or decree of any Court or Tribunal or any Arbitral Award for payment of money if not satisfied would fall within the ambit of a financial debt enabling the creditor to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC. The date of default has been held to be the date of arbitral award by the Adjudicating Authority without the Respondent No.1 having made a formal pleading to that effect. The Respondent No.1 not having amended their petition or made pleadings to the effect that the date of default had changed the Adjudicating Authority could not have held that the arbitral award of 28.04.2022 had reset the limitation period. In the given facts and circumstances it is inclined to agree with the Appellant that the Adjudicating Authority has erred in extending the period of limitation basis the arbitral award. Conclusion - i) The Respondent No.1 failed to bring about change in the date of default through a formal amendment in the Section 7 petition. ii) The Adjudicating Authority could not have held that the arbitral award of 28.04.2022 had reset the limitation period without the Respondent No.1 having made a formal pleading to that effect. The matter is remanded back to the Adjudicating Authority to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and on merits basis the amended pleadings if any filed by the Respondent No.1 - Appeal disposed of by way of remand. The matter is remanded back to the Adjudicating Authority to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and on merits basis the amended pleadings if any filed by the Respondent No.1.

The core legal questions considered by the Tribunal in this appeal arising under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) are as follows:

1. Whether the Section 7 application filed by the Financial Creditor was barred by limitation, considering the original date of default and the impact of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's Suo Moto orders excluding certain periods from limitation calculation.

2. Whether the date of default could be altered or extended by relying on an arbitral award passed subsequent to the original default date without a formal amendment of the Section 7 petition.

3. Whether the arbitral award constituted a fresh cause of action, thereby resetting the limitation period for filing the Section 7 application under the IBC.

4. The procedural propriety and legal validity of the Adjudicating Authority's reliance on the arbitral award to extend limitation despite the date of default pleaded in Part-IV of Form-1 remaining unchanged.

5. The applicability of precedents relating to acknowledgment of liability, amendment of pleadings, and the effect of judgments, decrees, or arbitral awards on limitation under the IBC and the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Limitation Period and Effect of Suo Moto Orders

The legal framework governing limitation for filing a Section 7 application is primarily Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a three-year period from the date of default. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No. 03 of 2020 excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 from limitation calculation owing to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court noted the uncontested fact that the original date of default was 12.11.2018. Calculating limitation from this date and excluding the Suo Moto period extended the limitation expiry to 28.10.2023. The Section 7 petition was filed on 08.11.2023, which was after this expiry date if limitation was counted solely from the original default date.

The Adjudicating Authority, however, found the petition to be within limitation by considering the arbitral award dated 28.04.2022 as creating a fresh cause of action, thus resetting the limitation period.

2. Alteration of Date of Default Without Formal Amendment

The Section 7 application's Part-IV clearly pleaded the date of default as 12.11.2018. The arbitral award was referenced in paras (g) and (h) of Part-IV, but the date of the award was not pleaded as a new date of default. No formal amendment application was filed to alter the date of default in the petition.

Precedents such as the Supreme Court's judgment in Ramesh Kymal Vs Siemens Gamesa (2021) and this Tribunal's ruling in Ramdas Datta Vs IDBI Bank (2023) establish that once the date of default is pleaded in a Section 7 petition, it becomes binding and cannot be altered without a formal amendment. Oral submissions or references in the factual narration do not suffice to change the date of default.

The Appellate Tribunal emphasized that the Adjudicating Authority erred in allowing the date of default to be effectively shifted to the date of the arbitral award without a formal amendment, thus misapplying procedural requirements and principles of fair pleading.

3. Whether Arbitral Award Constitutes a Fresh Cause of Action Resetting Limitation

The Supreme Court's decision in Dena Bank Vs C. Shivakumar Reddy (2021) is pivotal here. It holds that a final judgment, decree, or arbitral award for payment of money, if unsatisfied, constitutes a fresh cause of action enabling the Financial Creditor to initiate CIRP within three years from the date of such decree or award.

The Adjudicating Authority relied extensively on this principle, observing that the arbitral award dated 28.04.2022 gave rise to a fresh limitation period, thus rendering the Section 7 petition filed in November 2023 timely.

However, the Tribunal analyzed that while the arbitral award can indeed give rise to a fresh cause of action, the benefit of this fresh limitation accrual cannot be claimed without specifically pleading the award as the basis of default and amending the petition accordingly.

The Tribunal distinguished between the legal effect of the award and the procedural necessity of pleading. The arbitral award's existence alone, without formal acknowledgment in pleadings, does not automatically extend limitation.

4. Treatment of Competing Arguments on Acknowledgment and Pleading

The Respondent contended that the arbitral award was mentioned in Part-IV and annexed to the petition, which sufficed as acknowledgment and justified extending limitation. Reliance was placed on Vidyasagar Prasad Vs UCO Bank (2022), where the Supreme Court upheld the admission of a Section 7 petition despite certain documents not being pleaded in Form-1, reasoning that documents brought on record before the Adjudicating Authority must be considered for limitation and default.

The Appellant countered that the Vidyasagar case involved balance sheets, which are public and constitute acknowledgment to the world at large, unlike an arbitral award which requires explicit pleading. The Appellant relied on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. Vs Bishal Jaiswal (2021), where the Supreme Court held that acknowledgment of liability must be pleaded to extend limitation, and oral submissions or unpleaded documents cannot substitute formal amendment.

The Tribunal agreed with the Appellant's position, holding that the arbitral award, unlike a balance sheet, does not automatically operate as an acknowledgment for limitation purposes unless pleaded. The Tribunal underscored the necessity of formal amendment to alter the date of default and extend limitation based on the award.

5. Application of Law to Facts and Procedural Correctness

The Tribunal examined the impugned order and found that the Adjudicating Authority, while correctly applying the principle that an arbitral award can give rise to a fresh limitation period, failed to observe procedural propriety by not requiring the Financial Creditor to amend the petition to reflect the new date of default.

The Tribunal noted that the date of default in Part-IV remained 12.11.2018 throughout, and the Financial Creditor did not file any amendment to plead the arbitral award as the basis of default. The Adjudicating Authority's reliance on oral submissions to treat the award as resetting limitation was thus procedurally flawed.

The Tribunal further held that 'continuing default' is not a recognized concept under the IBC scheme for extending limitation.

6. Conclusions and Directions

The Tribunal concluded that the impugned order admitting the Section 7 application was unsustainable on the ground of limitation as the date of default pleaded was not amended to reflect the arbitral award date. The Adjudicating Authority erred in extending limitation without a formal amendment.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside, and liberty was granted to the Financial Creditor to amend the Section 7 petition within four weeks to plead the arbitral award as the new date of default. The matter was remanded to the Adjudicating Authority to decide afresh on limitation and merits based on the amended pleadings.

The Financial Creditor was directed to pay the IRP's fees and expenses as per the Adjudicating Authority's directions if not already done. No costs were imposed.

Significant Holdings:

"It is clear that the Adjudicating Authority has on its own held that the arbitral award gave rise to a fresh cause of action and a fresh period of limitation even while the date of default remained unchanged from what was declared as 12.11.2018 in Part-IV of the Section 7 application by the Respondent No.1."

"Once the Section 7 application is filed, the date of default in Part-IV becomes binding. We however notice that in the instant case, the Respondent No.1 failed to bring about change in the date of default through a formal amendment in the Section 7 petition."

"The Adjudicating Authority could not have held that the arbitral award of 28.04.2022 had reset the limitation period without the Respondent No.1 having made a formal pleading to that effect."

"An award or decree gives rise to a fresh cause of action and a fresh period of limitation. However, to claim the benefit of such fresh limitation, the creditor must specifically plead and amend the date of default accordingly."

"Acknowledgment of liability must be pleaded to extend limitation; oral submissions or unpleaded documents annexed to the petition cannot substitute for formal amendment."

"The concept of 'continuing default' does not find place in the scheme of the IBC for extending limitation."

"The matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority to decide the question of limitation and default afresh on the basis of amended pleadings, if any, filed by the Financial Creditor."

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