1995 (8) TMI 133 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of Rule 57F(4) of the Central Excise Rules regarding dutiability of scrap.
2. Eligibility of recycled aluminum scrap as an input under Rule 57F(2) for duty exemption.
3. Classification of waste under Rule 57F(4) and its coverage of recycled scrap.
4. Validity and retrospective effect of Trade Notice No. 94/89 as a supplementary instruction.
5. Allowance of additional relief in a pleading during a personal hearing before the Appellate Authority.

Analysis:

1. The case involved a dispute regarding the dutiability of scrap under Rule 57F(4) of the Central Excise Rules. The Tribunal, following a previous decision, held that the scrap generated in the factory was liable to pay duty under this rule.

2. The first issue raised was whether recycled aluminum scrap arising in the manufacturing process qualified as an input eligible for duty exemption under Rule 57F(2). The appellant argued that the scrap should be treated as an input covered by Rule 57A and thus eligible for the benefits of duty exemption under Rule 57F(2.

3. The second issue questioned whether waste mentioned in Rule 57F(4) included scrap generated in the manufacturing process that was subsequently recycled. The Tribunal's decision emphasized that the specific provision for scrap under Rule 57F(4) required duty payment when the scrap was sent outside the factory.

4. The validity and retrospective effect of Trade Notice No. 94/89 were also challenged. The appellant argued that the Trade Notice clarified that aluminum scrap could be removed without duty payment under Rule 57F(2. However, the Tribunal held that the Trade Notice could not be applied retroactively and did not override statutory provisions.

5. Lastly, the issue of allowing additional relief during a personal hearing before the Appellate Authority was raised. The Tribunal concluded that the executive instructions in the Trade Notice could not supersede statutory provisions, and thus dismissed the Reference Application, stating that no question of law for reference arose in this case.