1996 (7) TMI 217 - AT - Customs

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of the term "non-consumable store" under Section 61 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Application of Section 61(a)(i) and Section 61(a)(iii) to the imported product "Ferro-chrome."
3. Distinction between "goods" and "stores" under the Customs Act.
4. Relevance of definitions in the Import Export Policy in interpreting the Customs Act.

Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the interpretation of the term "non-consumable store" under Section 61 of the Customs Act, 1962. The appellant contested the order of the Collector (Appeals), which rejected their plea to classify the imported product "Ferro-chrome" as a non-consumable store and grant them a waiver of interest beyond the 3-month warehousing period. The Collector upheld the recovery of interest and rejected the refund claim, emphasizing the definition of "stores" under the Act.

Regarding the application of Section 61(a)(i) and Section 61(a)(iii) to the imported product, the appellant argued that "Ferro-chrome" should be considered non-consumable as it participates in a manufacturing process. The Revenue contended that Section 61(1)(a)(iii) refers to Section 65, which deals with manufacturing operations in a warehouse. The Tribunal analyzed these arguments and concluded that the imported goods did not qualify as non-consumable stores under the Customs Act.

The distinction between "goods" and "stores" under the Customs Act was crucial in determining the classification of the imported product. The definitions of these terms in Sections 2(22) and 2(38) were examined to understand the scope of "non-consumable stores." The Tribunal emphasized that the definition of "stores" in the Act should guide the interpretation of "non-consumable stores," rejecting the appellant's argument based on the Import Export Policy definitions.

The judgment highlighted the importance of statutory definitions and precedent in interpreting legal terms. Referring to a previous ruling, the Tribunal emphasized that definitions within the Customs Act should prevail over definitions in other statutes. The judgment reiterated that the term "non-consumable stores" should be construed in line with the specific definition of "stores" under the Customs Act, leading to the dismissal of the appellant's appeal based on the established legal principles.